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ABSTRACT 
The Routes of Rule: The Role of Roads in Kenyan Governance and Popular 
Evaluations of “Development” and Authority, 1890s-1992 	  
Emma Park  
 
My dissertation explores the “politics of mobility” over the course of Kenya’s colonial 
and postcolonial histories. Moving between the technopolitical strategies of the state and 
the quotidian practices of Kenyans, I consider how technologies of mobility have 
mediated social relationships, turning movement itself into a contested category of 
political action. In doing so, I track how colonial and postcolonial authorities have used 
road networks, the rights to mobility, and the circulation of the technologies associated 
with roads – bicycles, motorcycles, cars, and matatus (minibuses)  – to reward “loyal” 
constituencies, thereby variously marking inclusion and exclusion from popular though 
contested visions of “development” and “modernity.”  
Combining the insights of cultural studies and anthropology, with those of 
science studies, this research both tracks how the material and infrastructural routes of 
colonial and post-colonial governance have been used to extend coercive authority and, 
concomitantly, how these technologies have been appropriated by populations, 
becoming rich idioms as well as central material sites for popular expressions of 
discontent. To this end, this dissertation explores how roads are used as a central 
organizing theme in Kenyan discussions of the relative “development” of the country, 
discussions that popularly express regional understandings of the deprivations 
associated with state and everyday forms of corruption. 	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Prelude 
 
My friend Judy and I met in downtown Nairobi late one afternoon. We agreed to find one 
another at the Hilton hotel, which functions as a familiar landmark, its un-gated periphery 
a typical meeting place in the centre of Kenya’s capital city. The city itself is a place to 
which many people feel a rather ambivalent attachment. Indeed, affective attachments to 
the capital are very rarely articulated. There are moments when it seems that no one lives 
in Nairobi despite the large “informal” and suburban settlements that compose the city’s 
periphery. The common response to the question: “where are you from?” is reference to 
one of the regions outside of Nairobi, irrespective of the length of time one’s been 
domiciled in the growing metropolis. Within this context streets, though officially named, 
are not used as spatial points of reference.  
The unused names of Nairobi’s streets follow the familiar itinerary of nationalist 
histories, representing the attempt to inscribe the official story in space - a process of 
erasure whereby the contradictions and the contentious issues inherent to any history are 
effaced. The official street names are as familiar as the figures to which they refer: 
Kenyatta Avenue (first president of independent Kenya), Moi Avenue (second president 
of independent Kenya), Mboya Street (referring to Tom Mboya, vocal activist in the 
colonial period and Minister of Economic Planning and Development under Kenyatta, 
who was assassinated in 1969), and so on. However, it is monuments such as the Hilton, 
the National Archives, and Government House that operate as points of reference 
structuring the social space of the city.  
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 Initially, I contextualized Kenyans’ ambivalent relationship with the city’s road 
infrastructures against the backdrop of the relative want abetted by the absence of social 
spending that has by and large characterized the post-colonial period, particularly 
following the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s. However, this reading presents a series of 
problems. In particular, it does not account for practices of “popular” naming, which 
reflect an appreciation for the importance of marking time(s) and space(s) through 
appellations. The parts of the built environment whose names are used tell a different sort 
of story. A story that highlights a history of asymmetries of power as they are effected 
through the organization of space and the (geo)political regimes that are their conditions 
of possibility. For example: Kipande Street (a reference to the hated registration system 
of the colonial period); Vietnam (the name of a region in Mathare, one of the city's 
“informal” settlements); Katrina Hotel (opened after the 2005 hurricane that struck the 
Gulf Coast of the United States). The names that stick suggest that the popular readings 
of space that resonate are those which reference a long history of imperialism and 
inequality. In other words, as my research continues, I have come to suspect that people’s 
engagement with the space of the city, like the naming of businesses and 
neighbourhoods, must be contextualized against the backdrop of a longer, specifically 
colonial, history.  
As I argue, this prevailing spatial logic is part and parcel of the history of people’s 
engagement with the urban space of the capital – and its excluded peripheries - as it was 
shaped by policies of the colonial government, which explicitly and continuously 
attempted to limit Africans’ access to the urban core. These policies functioned to 
organize social space so as to secure the reproduction of asymmetric social relations, and 
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have left a legacy which informs popular readings of the role of space in the extension 
and maintenance of various forms of socio-economic and political marginalization. This 
complex and fraught history has shaped people’s engagements with the urban landscape, 
as well as the conceptual space it occupies, in critical ways.  
I bring up these anecdotes because they touch on some of the ideas and questions 
that will be explored in what follows: namely, the role of space in popular readings of 
power and the particular importance of discussions of roads and technologies of mobility 
in these readings. 
And now a return to the beginning – Prelude Part II  
Having gone for tea and exchanged books Judy and I decided to go to Kengeles, a bar 
close to the Terminal Hotel where I was staying at the time. On our walk away from 
“town” - the eight to ten block radius that composes the financial and administrative core 
of Nairobi - Judy explained to me how much things had changed since 2002 when Daniel 
arap Moi was finally removed from power. During Moi-era Kenya, the city streets were 
not electrified and the city was full of hawkers and parking boys, she told me. During the 
Moi years the city was marked as a place of insecurity: “There is no way I would have 
walked at night back then,” she explained. In this statement, Judy tapped into a long and 
powerful discourse on “development” in Kenya; a discourse wherein the passing of time 
and the changing contours of the political life of the country are popularly expressed 
through reference to expansions and contractions in the infrastructural life of the country.  
When we arrived at Kengeles, we started talking about the political situation in 
the country in the aftermath of the violence that followed the 2007 electoral race, which 
led to the eventual power sharing agreement between incumbent President Mwai Kibaki 
	   4	  
and now Prime Minister, Raila Odinga. After having ordered Gilbey’s and lime cordial 
conversation turned to Odinga. To me, there was something appealing about this political 
figure. As a Luo from Western Province he identifies himself with a region and 
community that widely perceives itself as having been excluded from Kenyan politics – 
something which is hotly contested - and the various spoils that attend representation in 
the highest echelons of power. 1 Indeed, it was Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM), which challenged the arguably defunct Kenyan electoral system, alleging that 
Kibaki’s Democratic Party (DP) had fixed the election, an accusation widely held to be 
true. Kibaki spilt from Kenya African National Union (KANU), which had been in power 
since independence, following the 1992 transition to multi-party politics. While both men 
had occupied roles in government throughout the years of an increasingly venal single- 
party system, it seemed to me that Odinga was something of an underdog in this race, 
representing a portion of the electorate that has been marginalized since the country 
gained independence in 1964. Judy quickly and easily dispelled this perception. “Raila,” 
she challenged, “he’s been the MP of Kibera for years and what has he done for them?”- 
Kiberia being arguably the largest “informal” settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, its 
estimated population hovering around the million-person mark. Moreover, and this was 
part of her point, it is composed of a population that, for years, was rendered functionally 
non-existent – not being included in the official census, this population was effectively 
denied citizenship. Incredulous, I asked her why people, now included in the census, 
continued to elect him as their MP – “Because he’s a Luo” she said without hesitation. I 
pressed her to explain this phenomenon, wanting to understand the motivation behind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 David William Cohen and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo, The Risks of Knowledge: Investigations into 
the Death of the Hon. Minister John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990, (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2004).   
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electing him given his supporters were not benefiting from having a co-ethnic as their 
MP. Trying to explain what I perceived to be somewhat idiosyncratic voting behaviour 
Judy employed a communicative device that proliferates in everyday discussions in 
contemporary Kenya:  
You know, it’s like Roads. For years, these roads were in total disrepair, there 
were holes to the centre. People paid money to have them repaired, a lot of 
people’s money went to that, and where did it go? It’s the same in Kibera. Odinga 
comes and promises that there will be toilets put in, and where are the toilets, 
where have they gone. He just keeps eating and they keep voting to let him eat. 
Before, no one said anything, they just kept quiet and kept giving money for roads 
and nothing happened. Now, now it’s not like that. Now people ask what road is 
going to be built, what road is going to be repaired…They want to know where 
their money is going, and if nothing is done people ask questions, they protest. 
The difference now, what I love about Kenyans now, is that they know their 
rights.2  
 
Encapsulated in this simile, in this drawing of likeness through analogy, Judy 
communicated a common wisdom and a popular frame of reference through which 
various socio-economic and political processes are indexed and debated in contemporary 
Kenya. 
In mobilizing the language of infrastructural development and accountability, 
Judy tapped into a conversation about uneven development as it occurs across space. In 
that moment something became clear to me. People’s ambivalence toward Nairobi was 
not necessarily the result of them having greater attachment to their “home” regions. By 
raising this discourse of roads, Judy was pointing to a conceptual link that exists between 
the organization of space and the reproduction of those myriad social relations that secure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These anecdotes are based on a conversation with my friend, Judith Maina, in the summer of 
2008 when I conducted my first round of fieldwork in Nairobi. Though this was an oral dialogue, 
the word “Roads” has been capitalized because, since the 1980s, the generic term has been 
deployed as a proper noun in the Kenyan print-media, reflecting the important conceptual place 
“Roads” occupy in postcolonial Kenyan discussions of “development,” the location of wealth and 
value, and social adulthood. 
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the marginalization of certain populations to the advantage of others. Space, in other 
words, is not thought by Kenyans as a neutral container within which social relations 
unfold; rather, its organization is thought to be a critical component in the constitution of 
those relations. Statements such as Judy’s confirm in more potent clarity Edward Soja’s 
observation that: “relations of power and discipline are inscribed in the apparently 
innocent spatiality of social life, [and that]…human geographies [are]…filled with 
politics and ideology.”3 Privileging the neutrality of spaces, it seems to me, is a privilege 
of the privileged. For the majority of Kenyans there is nothing neutral about the 
organization of space and theorists, as well as historians and anthropologists, ought to 
follow their lead.  
As alluded to, this banal reference to roads could be explained away as a product 
of the economic difficulties of the postcolonial era, particularly since the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s. Within this temporal framework, these statements appear to be 
nothing other than everyday expressions of exasperation with the “politics of ethnicity” 
that have characterized the postcolonial Kenyan political system, or mundane 
articulations of discontent with the perceived failures of the “promises of modernity” in 
the context of a faltering economy. There is a good deal to this reading. The Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) implemented at the behest of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as representatives of the neoliberal world order precipitated 
the economic crisis of the 1980s, the effects of which were palpable to the population. 
Following the initiation of SAPs, the standard of living in Kenya declined precipitously 
for the majority of the population as the county’s infrastructures and social services 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, 
(London; New York: Verso, 1989), 6.  
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deteriorated and unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels. To compound the 
situation, the venality of the Moi regime was increasingly visible to the struggling 
majority, corruption forcing the rate of inflation from 19.6 per cent to 27.5 per cent in 
1990. These conditions forced Moi’s hand and he begrudgingly conceded to donors’ 
demands, transitioning the country to a multiparty political system in the same year.4 In 
other words, it is without question that the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s have 
shaped Kenyans’ relationship with the concepts of “development” and “modernity” as 
they are read through and across space. 5  Roads, within this complex political and 
economic terrain have come to function as an explanatory device, emerging as a central 
indexical tool in popular discussions of corruption and relative development as they are 
read through the prism of ethno-regional patterns of stratification in the neoliberal 
present.  
To understand why this conceptual framework resonates so thoroughly for 
Kenyans, however, it is necessary to situate it not simply as a reaction to the conditions 
that have characterized the neoliberal era. Such a temporally bounded and narrow 
explanation cannot account for why it is roads in particular that have been taken up as a 
central idiom capable of expressing such density of meaning. Looking only to the 
postcolonial era precludes the possibility of excavating the series of intimately related 
and historically resonant ideas and conceptual fields that Judy conjured by mobilizing 
roads as idiom. A closer examination of the lexical framework, which attends to the 
pointed references to fraught socio-economic and political dynamics, suggests Judy was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Angelique Haugerud, The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya, (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 34. 
5 James Howard Smith. Bewitching Development: Witchcraft and the Reinvention of Development 
in Neoliberal Kenya. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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tapping into a much more complex set of interrelated discourses with a much longer 
history.  
In other words, popular discussions of the conditions of roads in Kenya extend 
beyond the obvious referent – roads proper – and taps into a series of historically deep 
discourses and practices. The idiom of roads raises questions about differential access to 
space and resources as they are associated with the rights of mobility. They are stories of 
where and for who capital is allowed accumulate and, concomitantly, stories of where 
power is popularly located and how its reproduction is secured. Discussions of roads, 
then, embody discourses of “development,” which link movement through space to 
socio-cultural and economic mobility.  
By linking infrastructural development to the conditions of possibility for 
individual action, these narratives reveal a reading of power that extends beyond the 
state. They point to the role of inter-generational conflict and ethno-regional patterns of 
stratification in the reproduction of inequalities as they are secured by circumscribing 
access to both literal and symbolic forms of cultural and material capital. If we accept the 
premise that roads have become an idiom through which power and, equally, its 
perceived absence is expressed, and accept that roads act as a stand in for both individual 
and collective “development,” equal attention must be paid to the place of technologies of 
mobility within this popular discourse. Central to roads discourse are the technologies 
that traverse these arteries – cars, lorries, bikes, matatus – which not only facilitate 
movement, but function as material markers of one’s position on both socio-economic 
and cultural hierarchies.  
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Crucially, however, roads and their technologies are not simply positively coded, 
they are equally linked to the extension of the state’s tentacular power. It is along 
Kenya’s roads that people encounter semi-official forms of extraction exacted at 
government roadblocks strategically placed to curtail the mobility (both symbolic and 
material) of some. Conversely, roads are critical sites of ongoing contestation, attempted 
appropriation, and confrontation. As such, roads and technologies of mobility - thought 
as material forms through which power is mediated, circulated, and reproduced - are 
inherently two-sided, and it is this Janus-faced quality that makes the idiom of roads such 
a flexible, and itself mobile, discourse.  
In order to unpack the density of meaning expressed through popular reference to 
roads and their related technologies it is necessary to trace their “cultural biographies” 
from the colonial era through to the present. 6  By approaching these technologies from 
the perspective of their longer histories, it will be possible to tease out the processes by 
which these material technologies have informed and structured Kenyan meaning-making 
in ways that at once complicate power’s functioning and yet reinscribe it (though often 
not in the same register) by speaking in its terms.7  The thesis to follow explores both 
how the material and infrastructural routes of colonial and postcolonial governance have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Igor Kopytoff, “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process,” in The Social 
Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai, 64-94 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); See also, Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Commodities and 
the Politics of Value,” in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. 
Arjun Appadurai, 3-63 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); For ways in which some 
of these ideas have been taken up in historical scholarship see Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial 
Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo, (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1999); Luise White, Speaking With Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa, 
Berkley: University of California Press, 2000.  
7 For an example of another piece of Africanist scholarship that traces the history of concepts, see 
Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 
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been used to extend coercive authority and, concomitantly, examines how these 
technologies have been appropriated by the populace, becoming rich idioms as well as 
central material sites for popular expressions of discontent. Over the course of this 
analysis, I also explore the role of materialities, in this case technologies of mobility, in 
shaping not only Kenyan readings of what constitutes “development,” but similarly in 
constituting multiply situated “modern” subjects.8 
Theoretical Orientation: A Roadmap for What Is to Come  
A historical unpacking of Judy’s statement bears out the arguments of scholars 
who insist on the importance of a critical investigation of space and materialities in 
understanding relations of power. While working in a different register, Judy's critique 
speaks directly to the work of Timothy Mitchell, who observes that technologies and 
infrastructures, as they are linked to logic of modernity, are too often treated as neutral 
forces, their proliferation an inevitable process which, he argues, leads to a relatively 
“restrained understanding of violence.”9 Building on these insights, I have come to 
understand the extension of road-networks and the circulation of their related 
technologies as practical strategies of governance; however, strategies which have had 
unpredictable power effects. Historically, these technologies were both a means of 
securing productivity and extending the disciplinary reach of the colonial state. They 
were critical to the process by which populations were arranged “in ways that simplified 
the classic functions of taxation, conscription, and [the] prevention of rebellion.”10 They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Timothy Burke, Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, & Cleanliness in 
Modern Zimbabwe, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 15. 
9 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 14. 
10 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.  
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were, in other words, critical to rendering the territory and its populations “legible,” to 
borrow James C. Scott’s formulation. 
Despite the critical insights provided by scholars such as Mitchell and Scott, their 
analyses remain relatively top down. They do not address how the connections among 
space, technologies, and governance have been popularly taken up in ways that, I argue, 
articulate with and yet exceed the parameters of state-centered studies. As we have seen, 
in the contemporary period there is nothing neutral about popular roads discourse in 
Kenya. People identify and discuss these technologies in ways that speak precisely to 
their violence(s). However, they are also powerful signifiers of “development” and 
“modernity,” which goes some way to explaining why technologies of mobility, in 
particular, are viewed as playing such a crucial role in mediating unequal social 
relationships. What follows thus situates the organization of space and the distribution of 
populations within it as critical to the reproduction of inequalities at the level of 
governance, and yet works to take seriously how these technologies have been taken up 
and made meaningful. It so follows that this thesis is interested in locating technologies 
that organize space as materialities that shape affective experiences of space and self. To 
do so, I explore the processes by which material instantiations of governance – in this 
case technologies of mobility – have been both taken up in discourse as powerful 
symbolic forms and the subsequent contestations that have emerged surrounding control 
over, and access to, these sites and objects.  
Working between the quotidian critiques of Kenyans and the academic literature 
on technologies of governance, this study raises questions about the relative reach of the 
colonial state in the Kenya colony. Scholars of colonialism have long questioned the 
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impact of colonial rule on the lives of the colonized.11 To this end, a number of scholars 
have questioned the applicability of a Focauldian analysis of power in colonial spaces. 
Typically, these studies argue that in contrast to the European context where modern 
forms of discipline acquired the capillary reach that is the trademark of modern power, in 
the context of the colony the reach of power was never so complete, knowledge of the 
population never developed the thoroughness that typifies modern bio-power, and 
discipline never acquired the positive qualities that ensures its seamless reproduction.12 
While these arguments without a doubt point to significant problems in how a 
Foucauldian analytic has been used in colonial contexts in general, and in the African 
context in particular, they presuppose the centrality of the state and its subsidiary 
institutions in the extension of power, thereby eliding a critical tenet of Foucault’s 
insights.13  
For Foucault, the central concern was not directed toward locating the state as the 
central locus of power. It was, rather, with identifying the locations where power takes on 
particular densities, places he often identified as being external to the state.14 In pursuing 
this research agenda, he suggested studies direct attention toward: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Claude	  Meillassoux,	  Urbanization	  of	  an	  African	  Community:	  Voluntary	  Associations	  in	  Bamako,	  (Washington:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1968);	  Georges	  Balandier,	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Black	  
Africa:	  Social	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where and how, between who, between what points, according to what processes, 
and with what effects, power is applied. If we accept that power is not a 
substance, fluid, or something that derives from a particular source. 
Then…analysis could and would [identify]…power in terms of the set of 
mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when 
they are unsuccessful, of securing power. 15 
 
As this deeply historicist passage suggests, in trying to think power, inquiry ought to be 
directed at practices and the seeming ephemera of discourse rather than state apparatuses 
or institutions. For it is within discourse – conceived in the broadest sense - that “the 
positive mechanics [of power] will operate…[in] the full language of everyday, which 
will constantly reinforce it with new accounts.”16 Despite the sites of his own research, I 
think this insight demands that we expand our purview in an attempt to locate the 
disciplining effects of power not simply in the barracks, the prison, the hospital, but 
equally in the everyday, quotidian practices that confirm it by speaking in its terms.  
As Janet Roitman reminds us, the utility of Foucault’s method lies in its ability to 
reveal:  
how the organization of knowledge gives rise to certain rationalities and practices, 
which are considered normal in specific, historical situations… [and it] also 
demonstrates how the organization of forms of knowledge and rationality 
structures resistance, certain forms becoming possible while others are not.17  
 
These insights critically inform my attempt to elucidate the feedback among material 
processes of governance, discourse, and popular practice. It is an attempt, in other words, 
to elucidate the genealogy of roads discourse; a discourse which, I argue, has had just 
such a disciplining function. This analysis excavates the processes by which roads 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78, 
ed. Michel Senellart,(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.  
16 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979), 112. 
17 Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience, 46.  
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discourse has come to embody a shared world of meaning and common-sense 
understandings of how socio-economic and cultural exclusions are forged and 
maintained.  
In this regard, this study shares some of the concerns highlighted by Achille 
Mbembe in his discussion of the functioning of power in the postcolony. Through putting 
discourse – again, broadly defined - at the centre of analysis, Mbembe demonstrates the 
ways in which power functions according to a system of signs and, correspondingly, the 
cultivation of common-sense dispositions that serve to reaffirm power with each 
successive iteration.18  In contrast to Mbembe, for whom the reproduction of power in the 
postcolonial African context is more or less seamless, leading to the mutual zombification 
of the subject and the commandant, we will, I hope, be able to see the doubled processes 
by which power can be rerouted as it is reproduced.  
To tap into this process of doubling it will be necessary to unravel the historical 
trajectories that have located this cluster of ideas in roads discourse by placing seemingly 
mundane practices at the centre of analysis. Scholars have long noted the central place of 
the politics of the everyday in the construction of meaning. An analysis of the banal, it is 
suggested, reveals how broader structures of meaning are received and remade at the 
level of practice.19 It is in this way that, as Jean and John Comaroff have noted, everyday 
routine constitutes a: “form of symbolic practice, [which is] part and parcel of the more 
embracing ‘discourses’ and ‘technologies’ that establish or contest regimes of rule.”20 It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2001), 102 
19 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff eds. Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual Power in 
Postcolonial Africa, (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Alberto Arce and 
Norman Long Anthropology, Development and Modernities: Exploring Discourses, Counter-
Tendencies and Violence, (London; New York: Routledge, 2000); Raymond Williams  
20 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, “Introduction,” in Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual 
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is because roads discourse has been a critical part of discussions of power, inequality, and 
rights to access over the longer durée that makes it a crucial point of entry into broader 
discussions regarding the appropriate organization of society, politics, and culture.  
This study, therefore, is not simply interested in how technologies of mobility 
function as explanatory frameworks. It is equally concerned with how these discourses 
have simultaneously operated as popular claims making devices in struggles over access 
to resources and rights of accumulation - struggles for which mobility is considered a 
necessary precondition.  
In tracing out this history this study builds on recent work on the politics of 
popular discontent in postcolonial Africa, which has traced the ways discussions of 
inequality are popularly expressed through idioms that convey localized understandings 
of broader structural (trans)formations.21 Though these studies address localized readings 
of the inequities that characterize postcolonial African political economies - addressing, 
for instance, discussions of witchcraft, the recent rise of Pentacostalism, and accusations 
of devil-worship - they focus on idioms that do not speak directly to the material effects 
of those inequalities. By contrast, my interest in examining roads as an explanatory 
device lies precisely in its ability to directly confront the concrete structures that ensure 
unequal distributions of wealth.  
Finally, I am interested in tracing out some of the continuities between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Power in Postcolonial Africa, eds., Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, (Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), xvi.  
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colonial and postcolonial eras by tracking the histories of technologies of mobility and 
their position within the social imaginary. Tracing both the ways roads have been used as 
a strategy of social control and popular attempts to circumvent that control, this study 
will address how the experience of colonialism, and the types of material and social 
inequalities popularly associated with it, continue to have purchase on postcolonial 
understandings of governmentality, particularly as it is related to socio-economic 
exclusions that inhibit achieving social adulthood.22 In sum, the task of what follows is to 
uncover the historical precedents of, and the conditions of possibility for, the 
development and proliferation of this popular discourse on roads. 
Chapter 1:  
(Im)mobility and Colonial Modernity 
The road is wanted for entirely administrative purposes, the control of a native 
population, and will not lead to any economic development.23 
 
Beginning in the early colonial period, this study addresses the colonial state’s use 
infrastructural development as a tactic of governance. From its inception, the colonial 
state viewed these infrastructures as critical routes of rule, a strategy of spatial 
organization deployed with an eye to creating a disciplined labour force. In order to 
understand the prominence of discussions surrounding road construction and the 
distribution of technologies of mobility, however, it is necessary to first address the 
critical place of these objects in emergent British notions of “modernity.”  
The technological transformations that were part and parcel of the process of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Mbembe, On the Postcolony; Nicolas Argenti, The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence and 
Belated Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007).  
23 KNA - RP Armitage, DC Elgeyo District, 1939. 
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industrialization produced new engagements with space and temporalities of movement.24 
First railroads, then improved road networks and automobiles, transformed popular 
experiences movement and revolutionized the relationship between space and time. 
Space, newly compressed, allowed travel at unprecedented speeds.25 The extension of 
these new routes across space, and the deployment of technologies across these 
infrastructures, not only brought previously distant regions into contact but also allowed 
for the emergence of centralized states, bureaucracies able to control previously isolated 
regions with greater efficiency.  
These technologies were thus critical to the development of new mechanisms of 
discipline whose efficacy was contingent on the organization of space and the 
enumeration of populations within it. As Mitchell writes: “overcoming…distances 
through the construction of railways, roads, shipping canals, and telegraphs all involved 
the creation of surfaces and enclosures, that could be opened, closed, extended, mastered, 
and improved.”26  
The control over space and its standardization abetted efforts to regiment people 
through the regularization of taxation and the collection of census records. The creation 
of these administrative grids rendered populations “legible,” a process which, as James C. 
Scott has observed, required the simplification of differences on the ground. Through 
processes of standardization, populations were thus transformed into data, easily 
calculated and categorized; statistics gathered with unprecedented efficiency and stored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria,(Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008) ,75-76. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 79. 
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in central repositories.27  
However, the creation of legible spaces did not produce a static system where 
movement was denied. “Modern” governmentality was less concerned with fixing 
populations in space than it was with ensuring people’s “productive” movement through 
space, while simultaneously eliminating the threats such movements engendered.28 These 
twin needs: facilitating movement while maintaining surveillance and securing 
productivity while minimizing resistance worked both to ensure the central state’s ability 
to control its populations and, concurrently, paved the way for capitalist expansion.  
Infrastructures of mobility – rail lines and surfaced roads – thus came to stand in 
for a certain envisioning of the modern. Infrastructures, writes historian Paul Edwards: 
“function…both conceptually and practically, as environment, as social setting, and as 
the invisible, unremarked basis of modernity itself.”29 The construction of infrastructures, 
on this reading, articulates humankind’s domination over “nature,” a category that 
emerges out of the very separation between the “social” and the “natural” that 
infrastructural developments facilitate.30 As the foregoing suggests, infrastructures and 
technologies were not simply abstract stand ins for the modern, nor were they simply the 
material pre-requisites of modern governance, they were equally critical to the 
constitution of “modern,” British subjectivities. As Michael Adas notes, Europeans 
“came to view science and especially technology as the most objective and unassailable 	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emergence of the “modern,” capitalist state.  
29 Paul Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the 
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measure of their own civilization’s past achievement and present worth.”31  
The intimate relationship between subject-formation and infrastructures was not 
limited to the metropolitan arena but was generalized, leading to the common perception 
that “modern” subjects could be created through their interaction with “modern” 
technologies.32 In a kind of circular logic it was supposed that while human ingenuity 
was responsible for the invention of technologies, interaction with these selfsame 
technologies was capable of transforming the populations with whom they came into 
contact. Harry H. Johnston, leading representative of the colonial party in Africa and 
colonial official, articulated this common-sense link between the logic of infrastructures 
and technologies, and the “civilizing mission” when he proclaimed: “There is no civilizer 
like the railway.”33 In this statement, not only did Johnston express the link between 
technology and civilizational “uplift” but, in a double move, connected both to the reach 
of capital. By joining civilization to capitalist expansion, and capitalist expansion to 
technology, moreover, Johnston positioned technologies as the driving agents in history, 
thereby eliding the violence of their functioning.  
Technologies, of course, are not neutral, but are necessarily “embedded in larger 
political and socio-cultural frameworks.”34 This insight requires an addendum, however. 
While technologies embody the ideologies of designers, that ideological content does not 
necessarily determine how technologies are used once set in motion, nor the meanings 
ascribed to them. That said there are limits to the ends to which technologies can be put, 	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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Larkin, Signal and Noise  
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which inhere in the very materiality of the technologies themselves. It is this vexed and 
doubled quality of technologies that, as Gabrielle Hecht astutely notes, constitute 
technologies as a terrain for “transforming, enacting, or protesting power relations within 
the social fabric.”35 
If we take this as our starting point, it so follows that roads and road-related 
technologies were as much implicated in the violence of colonialism as those practices 
that emerged out of more obviously imperial ideologies. Indeed, British readings of the 
relative advancement of populations were premised on this technologically driven vision 
“progress,” which informed emergent discourses of racial inferiority. As Adas notes, 
those populations who favored technologies legible to the British qua “technologies” 
were situated as being closer to the British on the technological cum civilizational 
hierarchy. Speaking of road building, in particular, Adas writes: “proficiency [was] vital 
in winning…favorable assessments of …social development from a number of British 
travelers and missionaries.”36 Crucially, this method of mapping populations and their 
relative “development” would continue throughout the colonial period. African 
engagements with this technologically driven reading of “development” at once 
complicated and reinscribed the contours of this narrative as it was mediated through 
technologies of mobility.  
     *** 
 “Modern” infrastructures were thus part and parcel of the Enlightenment faith in 
the possibility of a “rationally” engineered world.37 The “transparency” and “legibility” 	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achieved through the extension of infrastructural networks in metropoles across Europe 
became the model (albeit imperfectly applied) for colonial governance. In the case of the 
Kenya colony, in particular, efforts to direct the flow of Africans’ movements along 
infrastructures of mobility formed the crux of colonial praxis. 
In part, this tactic of governance emerged piecemeal as a result of the particular 
contours of colonial capitalism in Kenya. Without an obvious extractable primary 
resource, the brunt of the colonial economy fell to the agricultural sector, particularly in 
the fertile Central Province and Rift Valley. Furthermore, the metropolitan prerogative of 
colonial self-sufficiency stipulated that all development be financed from within the 
colony itself. 38  To achieve this, large tracts of African land were expropriated and 
redistributed to European settler populations, creating large fenced off agricultural 
estates. In 1926, the administration established Native Reserves which, in theory, would 
provide for the subsistence of Africans inhabiting them.39 However, in between these 
enclosed settlements and the reserves were populations of largely landless peoples who 
composed the main labouring force on European farms.40  
Initially, these arrangements appeared to build on precolonial precedents, with 
ahoi (landless “tenants”) acting as clients to wealthier land-holding patrons, only now the 
patrons were white. Whereas precolonial social arrangements were premised on alliances 
forged between ahoi and wealthy householders, an arrangement that was sealed by 
marriage allowing ahoi to claim the “female right to land,” during the colonial period 
these paths to upward socio-cultural mobility were blocked. And ahoi, an identity 	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acceptable within the precolonial Kikuyu moral economy, were denigrated. People 
became “squatters.”41  
While various African “big-men,” notably Chiefs “loyal” to the colonial state, 
were able to exploit the new opportunities offered by emergent markets, for the bulk of 
landless young men the estate system left fewer options.42 In a manner that recalls the 
processes of enclosure that Timothy Mitchell describes in the context of Egypt, the space 
between the estates and the reserves functioned for these people:  
as a sort of prison…Reinforcing the discipline created by the walls and 
gates…was the power generated by the wider arrangements of which it was a part. 
This was the other side of the successful control of labor: the expansion of the 
estate system to eliminate the opportunity of escape to a less coercive 
alternative.43 
 
This analysis could be applied to Central Kenya where newly configured social relations 
were inscribed in the very process of reordering the territory’s geography. Within this 
system, the majority of Africans were to serve two intimately related functions. First, 
they were to compose the labour force, facilitating the expansion of the productive 
capacities of the settled farms and the holdings of local big men.  Second, as subjects of 
the crown they were to facilitate the “development” of the colony by being transformed 
into a taxable body.44  
The transformation of people into a population, a prerequisite for the creation of a 
taxable base, required the extension of an administrative grid, and the development of 
mechanisms to control people’s movements. Almost immediately, then, these spatial 	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arrangements worked to create what Janet Roitman terms “fiscal subjects.”45 The 
demands of labour ensured that the organization of space would not simply immobilize 
populations but would fashion spaces that were semi-porous; a strategy variously 
designed to keep African populations out of the settled schemas except as laborers, within 
their supposed districts of origin, and yet ensure the movement of some as seasonal 
laborers.  
If the condition of possibility for the colonial economy was premised on attempts 
to circumscribe the ebbs and flows of populations’ movements, unsanctioned mobility 
emerged as the foremost strategy of evasion. An examination of the events unfolding in 
the early tens in the Central Province, documented in the Kikuyu District Political Record 
Book, point to a number of processes that, while mutually constitutive in the broader 
colonial attempt to render the territory and population legible, remain distinct issues in 
the colonial record. Throughout the period, District Commissioners reported that 
headmen, either due to their own obstinance or that of the populations they governed, 
were unable to collect Hut Tax. In particular, headmen were having difficulty collecting 
tax from those living outside reserves on settler farms.46 These “natives,” administrators 
lamented, paid no heed to regulations governing taxation. This “problem,” of course, was 
the direct product of the contradictions of colonial rule. The state required the outflow of 
migrant laborers and tenant farmers for its economy to function, yet simultaneously 
desired colonial populations be beholden to local “authorities” working at the behest of 
the colonial government.  
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The Hut Tax regulation of 1901, and later the Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910, 
ensured that Africans bore the brunt of the costs of administering the territory. These 
fiscal measures not only ensured the legibility of people in space, but also mass African 
participation in the settler economy as laborers and tenant farmers, recursively enabling 
the material expansion of the state.47  Indeed, in 1923, government revenue was 1.8 
million pounds sterling, with African taxation in the same year being half a million 
pounds sterling; thus comprising nearly a third of total revenue.48 In itself this might not 
be surprising, after all Africans composed the majority population. However, when these 
returns are read against the patterns of reinvestment the role of native-taxation in 
reproducing an economy dominated by settler interests becomes clear. As R.M.A. van 
Zwanenberg has shown, only 10 per cent of the taxes collected in African regions were 
reinvested locally and this revenue was predominantly devoted to paying the costs of 
future tax collection and the costs of administration. The other 90 per cent was taken out 
of African districts and redirected to other locations, making it “quite clear that the 
severity of African taxation was a direct consequence of the financial needs of the 
European infrastructure.”49   
  These conflicting desires – required mobility, on the one hand, and enforced 
immobility, on the other - were in perpetual tension and were further complicated as 
people in greater numbers engaged in short- and long-term migrancy. “Local headmen,” 
it was reported, “have no authority over them [laborers] and they are rapidly becoming 
undisciplined and developing the undesirable characteristics of the semi-civilized native,” 
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one early Colonial Officer stationed in Central Province reported.50 Although labour 
migrancy was sanctioned, indeed encouraged, it was being deployed by Africans as a 
strategy designed to evade the demands put to them by local headmen, undermining 
headmen’s authority in the process.51 
For colonial administrators and local headmen alike, physical mobility was 
connected to a perceived shift in the minds of the “young,” whose travel rendered them 
unwilling to concede to the demands of their “elders.” These concerns broadly reflected a 
colonial logic that linked “tradition” to a land-based stability, thereby positioning the 
emergence of “undesirable” qualities as a direct outgrowth of the physical movement of 
these laboring men. This, however, constituted a flagrant misinterpretation of the history 
of the region, wherein social organization had long been premised on mobility; 
movement a strategy deployed in pursuit of trade and alliances, the resulting relationships 
secured through the bonds of blood brotherhood and fictive kinship.52  
Effacing this longer history, headmen began initiating round-ups and meting out 
punishments – namely in the form of compulsory labour - to increasing numbers of 
“itinerant” persons in an attempt to halt the supposed rerouting of authority, prestige, and 
capital achieved by these mobile populations.53 As these events suggest, fixing 
populations was not only critical to the functioning of the colonial economy as it relied 
on the appropriation of the authority of “elders,” it was equally crucial to colonial 
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readings of the development of “modern” African subjectivities, something which will be 
discussed in greater detail in what follows.  
While some used the possibility of capital accumulation promised by tenancy as a 
means of refusing the compulsory labor demanded by headmen, others challenged the 
state’s spatial authority in more direct ways by relocating to spaces beyond the reach of 
the state’s nascent surveillance apparatus. In 1910, the Provincial Commissioner of 
Central Province was notified that a settlement had been established on the Mau 
Escarpment, outside of the reserve, and therefore outside the spatial parameters 
sanctioned by the colonial state for African settlement. The report, which is quite typical, 
read as follows:  
Thirty-one Kikuyu, including 11 men were found on the hills with huts and 
shambas which shewed [sic] a residence of about 18 months. Each male adult was 
fined and imprisoned with Hard Labour for one month. All paid their Hut Tax to 
their respective headmen but as they had left their districts without permission 
from the latter they were brought back to Kikuyu and had all their huts burnt.54 
 
In a gesture that would become increasingly common, people circumvented the demands 
of labor put to them by the colonial state through its native “proxies” by drawing on long-
held strategies of mobility and relocating to spaces beyond its reach.55 In this instance, 
even complying with the demands of taxation did not exculpate the spatial transgression 
represented by the settlement.56 Though not stated in the report it is likely that the 
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55 Robertson, Trouble Showed the Way, 64; Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, 1500-1900. 
56 It is worth noting that to speak of indirect rule in the context of Kikuyuland (as elsewhere) is 
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punishment for this transgression was roadwork, which comprised one of the main forms 
of compulsory labour demanded of Africans by the state.  
Officially, forced labour on roads was reserved for “criminals.” However, the 
structures of colonial governance provided innumerable opportunities for unsanctioned, 
but by and large licit, acts of coercion. Indeed, if it was argued (as it often was), that a 
prospective road would benefit “natives” (a claim that was often questionable) the state, 
through local headman, could legally call upon compulsory labour. This practice was 
naturalized by the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance, which provided the legal framework 
for the government’s use of coercion to raise labor for infrastructural projects without 
remuneration. In this move, the government effectively created a system wherein African 
populations, particularly those that had been picked up by the nascent surveillance 
apparatus of the colonial state, were forced to forge the routes of administrative rule. 
Denied access to unencumbered movement, forced labor on roads must have appeared 
cynical to Africans, who purportedly resented road labour more than any other form of 
enforced work.57 But semi-legal coercion was not the only option open to administrators.  
The infrastructures of rule were a constant preoccupation – a near fetish - of the 
British colonial state, which directed much of the revenue gained through taxation to 
forging technological networks in the form of roadways. Like tenancy, labor on roads 
was crucial to creating a taxable base, and numerous Public Works projects were initiated 
specifically to create positions for wage labourers. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale 
estimate that on the eve of the First World War, over 10 per cent of those employed in the 
wage labour economy were working for either the railroad or the Public Works 
Department, numbers which were presumably higher in agricultural regions, namely the 	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Central Province and the Rift Valley. In 1915, acting District Commissioner of Fort Hall, 
E.L. Pearson, reported that the majority of labourers were, indeed, employed on Public 
Works projects, specifically road building, where they laboured for 5Ksh and rations.58  
In regions where remunerated positions were not readily available, populations 
were unable to pay their taxes. In response, infrastructural projects were created with the 
express mandate of securing the income required by the colonial state. Provincial 
Commissioner of Rift Valley Province, D.L. Morgan, made this prerogative clear in his 
request to the Public Works Department and the Secretariat for the construction of a road 
from Kabarnet to Baringo District. The road, he argued, would not only increase crop 
production and function as an administrative artery but, more importantly, its 
construction would create positions for wage-labourers, and thus increase the state’s 
revenues:  
I would also point out that this year large numbers of able bodied moran have not 
paid their tax, due to their inability to find employment on European farms, and I 
do not think I exaggerate in maintaining that at least 60% - probably more - of the 
money paid as wages to the construction gang would return to the Government in 
the form of tax.59 
 
This road works project was subsequently approved. While it is not clear that the creation 
of a taxable base was a primary motivation for the approval, it is clear that it was not the 
possibility of greater accumulation promised by the creation of the routes of trade for, as 
Morgan admitted: 
It would be many years before a road to the plateau would be used commercially, 
as the only exports from this district at present are sheep and goats and a small 
quantity of hides…[Thus,] the immediate justification for the road would be its 
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undoubted administrative value and to provide the means whereby large numbers 
of young men can find their tax.60 
 
In the spirit of Johnston (cited above), Morgan expressed his confidence in the changes 
cutting such a road would effect. The road, he proclaimed, was “of paramount importance 
for the development of this backward district.” While the argument that road building 
projects would at once facilitate the advancement of a region and fill state coffers was 
fairly typical, in mobilizing the language of civilizational advancement, the DC justified 
his demand that the funds come not from the government but from the Local Native 
Council (LNC). In this case, arguably, this was the condition of possibility for the 
project’s approval. If Morgan’s logic was accepted, this particular project would allow 
for 60 per cent of the wages doled out by the Local Native Council (LNC), to be 
redirected to the state through taxation. Thus, while the rhetoric of regional improvement 
may have been the condition of possibility for the project’s approval, the main benefactor 
would be the state.  
Communications networks designed to connect “peripheral” regions to the central 
state, thereby extending surveillance and ensuring the accumulation of wealth in state 
coffers, clearly had material effects. However, the discursive and rhetorical arguments 
administrators advanced in justifying the construction of new roads did work of a more 
conceptual kind as well. For administrators such as Morgan, infrastructural expansion 
and the ideology of civilizational uplift were intimately related, with the road operating as 
a symbol of their marriage. Roads not only modernized landscapes but produced modern 
subjects.  
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This rhetoric, linking labour to infrastructural and, consequently, social 
development was ubiquitous. Indeed, one of the main arguments invoked in justifying the 
use of forced labor on road works cited the didactic value such labour afforded. Colonial 
officials argued that coerced labour, particularly on the extension of road networks which 
were for “the common good,” would lead to the cultivation of a loyal, though subservient 
brand patriotism among colonial subjects.61 Contact with the central state facilitated by 
the expansion of infrastructures was part of this calculus, but so too were the perceived 
disciplinary benefits of hard labour. To a significant degree, then, the road operated as a 
stand in for the modernizing potential of the colony and its people. The discourse 
surrounding roads and labour positioned the British colonial government as a “techno-
political regime,” which Clapperton Mavhunga defines as a system of rule, that is 
simultaneously: “a political structure that...[does] technical work and a technical structure 
that...[does] political work.”62  
It is therefore not surprising that forced labour was one of the most resented 
features of colonial governance, and labour on roads became emblematic of those 
colonial coercions designed to create a taxable base. Throughout the early colonial 
period, local headmen routinely complained of the resistance they confronted when trying 
to get communities to cut and maintain roads within native reserves.63  While this was 
often written off as yet more evidence of native “laziness,” some colonial officials 
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understood people’s resistance within the framework of the inequity of the colonial 
political economy. As the District Commissioner of Machakos summed up in a rare 
moment of clarity: “The native labourer look[s]…on the road, through his particular 
portion of the country, as a never ending source of hard work which seldom grows less 
but rather tends to increase.”64 He went on to explain that labour was not the dominant 
frustration. Rather, people complained of the asymmetry in the quality of roads serving 
settled farms versus those serving African areas. Conceding the point, he concluded: “It 
seems very unfair that quite large sums of money are voted annually for roads which 
often only serve a very few occupied farms, when not a penny is available for one which 
taps the majority of a Native Reserve with a vast population.”65 The practice of strategic 
infrastructural under-development secured the dominance of the settler economy and the 
comfortable position of often corrupt African headmen was secured, as was labour, which 
disadvantaged the small-scale, relatively autonomous production of Africans living on 
the reserves and estates.  
This was increasingly resented by Africans who were in a:   
 
considerable state of discontent …on the whole question of roads and 
communications in…reserve[s]. He [“the African”] wants roads; and the more 
advanced native realizes the vital necessity of communications to trade…No 
money is ever available for any road – if it only serves a Native Reserve.  
 
The desire for roads, as this communiqué demonstrates, was popularly linked in the 
colonial imagination to the relative development of communities. Importantly, moreover, 
this passage sheds light on the conceptual space that roads were coming to occupy in the 
imaginary of Africans living in the Central Province and Rift Valley.  	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Like colonial administrators, roads were held to be the routes of development. 
African entrepreneurs viewed these infrastructural networks as the prerequisite for the 
expansion of African trade, which would, theoretically, allow populations to avoid 
labouring on European farms. Absent government investment in roads serving African 
areas, people took matters into their own hands, cutting secret paths across the colony, 
linking people to markets.66 Popular attempts to reorder space, forging routes connecting 
reserves to points of trade, undermined efforts by the colonial administration to spatially 
marginalize the entrepreneurs of Central Province and the Rift Valley. As these popular 
responses suggest - both in the form of resistances and demands for expanded road 
networks – people living in the “unhappy valley” had equally come to view the road as a 
modernizing force; however, their definition(s) of the modern were often at odds with the 
cultivation of docile subjects that colonial authorities had hoped to effect by placing 
communities in contact with modern infrastructures. While colonial authorities desired 
advancement in the form of a more efficient and prosperous economy, requiring Africans 
remain in a servile position as laborers and tax-payers, Africans were demanding that 
they be recognized as subjects with the same rights to capital accumulation and 
remuneration that non-African populations were afforded.  
      *** 
Labour on roads and the extension of road networks were not only emblematic of 
critical asymmetries between African populations and settler populations. Indeed, the 
extension of these technologies of rule emerged as the terrain upon which relations 
between headmen and populations were negotiated. In Central Province, in particular, the 
tensions surrounding road works entered into ongoing debates regarding legitimate 	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authority and the passing of generational power embodied in what John Lonsdale refers 
to as the Kikuyu “labour theory of value.”67 Through labour on the land Kikuyu achieved 
wiathi, “moral agency” achieved through “self-mastery.” Private achievement within this 
moral economy was proof that an individual had realized wiathi, the legitimacy of which 
was contingent on the redistribution of wealth. Wealth was thus a moral as well as 
material status.68 Public authority derived from both virtue (wealth) and knowledge (age). 
In theory, public authority moved between generations, as young men, with access to the 
land on which they had laboured, worked to achieve wiathi and the authority it yielded. 
The colonial organization of space, premised as it was on the partitioning of the territory 
and the control of bodies within it, obstructed the ability of many young men to achieve 
this state of moral adulthood.69 These problems were exacerbated as appointed headmen, 
illegitimate authorities in the eyes of many, shored up their status by accruing great 
masses of wealth. Claire Robertson notes: “Colonialism confirmed the translation of 
prominence in trade into political eminence.”70 Political authority, once contingent on 
wealth and redistribution, was increasingly individuated, processes symbolically marked 
by headmen’s use of trucks to transport goods to market.71 In the minds of many power 
and virtue, historically two sides of the same coin, had been disarticulated.  
Concurrently, headmen played a critical role in the extension of infrastructures of 
rule. They were “British subordinates, [who, in the service of colonial authorities,] 
…collected tax on commission, compelled the cultivation of new crops…ordered out 
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labour on local roads and recruited it for outside employers.”72 Individual District 
Commissioners, specifically those working in the settled regions, were explicit on this 
point. As the DC of Fort Hall expressed in 1919, it was the responsibility of headmen to 
maintain law and order within their boundaries, to “maintain in a decent state of repair all 
roads, bridges, Government & Kiama Camps in their locations…to prohibit any act 
which might damage any public work or road within their location.”73  
In other words, it was the central responsibility of headmen to secure the free 
labour needed to build infrastructural routes through the country, and to ensure that these 
routes were maintained and protected against degradation, whether the product of 
directed action or not. This was no easy task in the Kenya colony. The heavy rains and 
stubborn ecology proved to be an enduring frustration for administrators.74 Roads were 
routinely washed away and creeping ecologies routinely undermined “culture’s” 
domination of “nature.” Road infrastructures in the Kenya colony were never “modern” 
in the sense discussed by Edwards. Their materiality was constantly threatened by other, 
difficult to tame, materialities. As one DC wrote: maintaining roads was a constant battle 
“ever permanent, never to be relied upon and often ultimately abandoned.”75 It thus took 
a good deal of conceptual and material labour to maintain these infrastructures, ostensible 
evidence of man’s mastery over nature, and man’s mastery over man. Africans bore the 
brunt of these efforts, forced as they were by headmen to cut and maintain these colonial 
technologies under siege. Road works were thus linked to inter-generational struggles 
over landed status as they were shaped by new rhythms of rule.  	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Headmen not only severed the connection between public authority and 
communal wellbeing but also unraveled the links between labour and virtue. Many of 
these men, wise to the opportunities the system presented them, exchanged the 
“unproductive” labour of juniors and women for easy wealth.76 In exchange for labourers, 
headmen received kick-backs, frequently being “handed…cases of whiskey and brandy 
for so many recruits produced” from colonial agents and labour recruiters operating 
within their regions.77 These informal arrangements provided the framework through 
which labour could be recruited for private employers and the state while circumventing 
the legislation that prohibited the state from directly engaging in coercive labour 
recruitment.78  It is likely that these incentives for procuring labour led to increasingly 
violent labour practices in the 1920s.79  
The violence of the interwar period added a troubling patina to roads discourse in 
the Kenya colony. In his private papers, Colonial Officer Richard Gethin, recounted 
recruitment patterns typical of the period. In return for favors chiefs would raise labourers 
who were subsequently tied together and forced to march between districts along the 
administrative routes of the country.80 The forced marches along the colony’s arteries not 
only frustrated young men’s attempts to achieve self-mastery and thus social standing but 
sometimes led to the end of biological life as well. In the mid-teens, settlers of the Central 
Province wrote a flurry of complaints to the District Commissioner, protesting the sight 
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of Africans lying dead along main roads. A letter signed by four concerned settlers 
requested that: 
the police authorities to look into the matter and the manner of death of Kikuyus 
who are continually to be seen dying or dead in the ditches by the Nairobi Road 
between the Chania Falls and Nairobi. We, the undersigned, have known of or 
seen five (5) bodies rotting at the same time in different points of the 
road…Surely this public disgrace should be removed.81 
 
As the correspondence between settlers protesting this “disgrace” and the District 
Commissioner continued, it was admitted by the acting DC that those dying were 
Africans engaged in forced labour, and that the deaths were a consequence of 
malnutrition. Unlike in the metropole where roads were associated with the right to 
autonomous, unencumbered movement, in 1920s Kenya roads where symbolic of, and 
the physical site where, autonomy and mobility were denied both through the quasi-legal 
raising of forced labour and as a physical consequence of the conditions under which 
Africans worked. Unsurprisingly, the violence of this era led to new attempts by 
populations to relocate to spaces that were beyond the reach of these various agencies and 
structures of colonial coercion.  
Colonial efforts to reorder space and authority, thus articulated awkwardly with 
precolonial forms of social organization embodied in the Kikuyu “labour theory of 
value.” Efforts to impose a new administrative grid, designed to serve new relations of 
power, not only complicated prior systems of land occupation and wealth accumulation 
but, perhaps most crucially, undermined people’s ability to achieve social adulthood. The 
creation of enclosures designed to accommodate the needs of a growing settler population 
led to land scarcity for Africans living in the Central Province and Rift Valley. 
Furthermore, the unique possibilities open to loyal headmen willing to raise labour 	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ensured that wealth was increasingly concentrated in the hands of few. As a result, many 
young men were relegated to a position of perpetual junior status. Lacking land and 
cattle, it was impossible for them to secure the bride wealth necessary for marriage.  
The disciplinary abuses of this period, in conjunction with the structural barriers 
to adulthood, had unexpected consequences as young men, alienated from power, 
increasingly chose desertion over unfair labour practices, leaving their regions of origin 
in search of higher wages in the growing urban centers of Nairobi and Mombasa. Wage 
labour in the city, it seems, presented unprecedented opportunities for alienated young 
men, for whom “poverty was delinquent.”82 Working in towns, these frustrated juniors 
labored to buy “freedom from parents by investing the wages of external service in 
marriage”83 City life promised new avenues by which men could attain social adulthood 
not through labour on the land but through capital accumulation, thereby themselves 
rerouting the criteria defining legitimate authority. Virtue was being disconnected from 
landed wealth and new forms of labour were redefining the landscape of value. Tellingly, 
headmen and wealthy elders referred to these men and women disparagingly as the 
people of “the roadside.”84  
In response to increasing levels of desertion, which undermined the authority of 
“elders” and thus that of the colonial state, the administration devised new strategies to 
constrain movement outside the reserves. The Natives Ordinance of 1915, implemented 
in 1918, required every African over the age of 15 be registered and finger printed. These 
registration certificates, or kipandes, were to be worn around the neck in metal frames 
and could be demanded at any time. Any African found outside their reserve who was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Lonsdale, “Moral Economy of Mau Mau,” 340.  
83 Ibid., 354.  
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unable to produce the document and evidence that they had permission to be moving 
outside reserve limits was punished with hard labour. Critical to this process was the 
centralization of knowledge. As article 21 of the ordinance read:  
No matter how many Registration Certificates are issued to any one person 
 or in whatever places they are issued, on arrival at Central Records they are 
 connected by means of finger impression records and cross referenced. Thus if 
 any one person takes out, say twenty different registrations in twenty different 
 places throughout the Colony his complete records is known and united at the 
 Central Records Office.85 
 
The centralization of demographic knowledge, as discussed above, was part and parcel of 
the process of modern state formation. Obviously, however, in the context of colonial 
Kenya, the population was not regarded as an undifferentiated mass to be counted, 
categorized, and disciplined, but as a multiply tiered body. Importantly, the generation 
most directly effected by the ordinance was also mission educated and literate, and thus 
in a unique position to make claims on both colonial and metropolitan authorities.   
Indeed, as early as 1921 the Kikuyu Association of Central Province was 
demanding the abolition of the kipande system which, to many, had become symbolic of 
the abuses of the colonial system. In framing its argument, the Kikuyu Association cited 
police abuses, noting that kipandes were not only being demanded outside of the reserves 
but within the confines of the reserves themselves.86 While not specifically identified as a 
method of surveillance concerned with the organization of people in space at this 
juncture, by the late 1920s demands for its abolition were explicitly framed according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 KNA - “Report of the Sub Committee of the Labour Advisory Board Appointed To Examine 
Any Suggestions Submitted to it for the Revision of the Present Native registration System and to 
Make Recommendations as to Any Modifications Considered Desirable.” Oct 29, 1946.  
86 “Report of the Sub Committee of the Labour Advisory Board Appointed To Examine Any 
Suggestions Submitted to it for the Revision of the Present Native registration System and to 
Make Recommendations as to Any Modifications Considered Desirable.” Oct 29, 1946.  
	   39	  
a logic that linked limitations to movement to servility and positioned mobility as the 
quintessential marker of liberty.87   
 Debates over the limitations placed on people’s ability to move through space 
dovetailed with broader discussions of “development” as they were filtered through the 
prisms of “tradition” versus “modernity,” and linked to questions of legitimate authority. 
In 1919, the District Commissioner of Fort Hall reported that inter-generational struggles 
dominated discussions at barazas throughout the district, pitting native authorities against 
young, literate, and mobile men. The younger generation articulated its right to 
governance by mobilizing a binary that drew powerfully on British notions of modernity. 
The current generation of elders, they argued, were mired in superstition and tradition, 
which not only rendered the young who “had the benefit of greater knowledge of the 
European...powerless to carry out the Government orders of progression” but was also 
used by elders to justify the unfair demands being put to populations. Elders, in turn, 
defended their right to retain leadership, arguing that they had paid large sums of money 
to “buy the country.” The mobility of the current generation of young men, “spoilt” by 
virtue of their movement, elders argued, impeded their ability to recoup the losses of their 
initial investment.88 Young men vociferously rejected this claim, arguing that by virtue of 
their broader experience and education, they were in a better position to hold the reins of 
governance. Changed circumstances, they contended, had rendered the wisdom of elders 
obsolete.89  While this was articulated as a movement in terms of cultural transformation 
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(read “modernization”) the rhetoric used to explore and account for these shifts was 
expressed through reference to physical movement, which contrasted a younger 
generation that “wished to march with the times,” against the immobility and stagnation 
of elders. In this emergent discourse, physical movement, the technologies that facilitated 
it, and the opportunities it afforded, were positioned as necessary prerequisites for the 
cultivation of modern selves.90  
The cultivation of modern subjects was, of course, something colonial authorities 
ostensibly supported. However, in this instance, these men were mobilizing the language 
of civilizational advancement to undermine the present generation of native authorities. 
The colonial state had produced this quagmire. The mobility demanded by the colonial 
economy facilitated the emergence of a mobile and increasingly vocal population, who 
challenged the worst abuses of colonial rule affected through the co-optation of local 
authorities. In a doubling that continues to shape Kenyan mobility discourse in the 
present youth, largely excluded from political power, articulated their demands for a 
greater share of authority by contrasting their mobility – both physical and psychological 
- against the outmoded and stagnant outlook of “elders.” The articulation of the demands 
of colonial rule with Kikuyu labour theories of value and its spatialized imagining of 
virtue through labor on the land had produced mobility and generation as the fault lines 
of conflict. 
Symbolically as well as materially, then, these routes had a doubled function in 
the popular imaginary. Not only did they facilitate export and thus the enrichment of 
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settled populations and “greedy” elders and chiefs – routes of commerce often blocked 
for use by marginalized African producers - but they also functioned as the material stand 
in for the state’s tentacular power. The hardest hit, as the foregoing has suggested, were 
“youth.” Drawing on precolonial strategies of mobility, they were met with a legal 
system and structure of governance that pivoted on controlling African mobility. Once 
sanctioned movement became unsanctioned, as histories of mobility were being 
reconfigured, and the transgression of both “elder” and “colonial” spatial logics was met 
with compulsory labour on the routes that secured colonial domination. But roads were 
also symbolic of a promise: the possibility of autonomous physical mobility and the 
symbolic and social mobility that attended it.  
    *** 
By the 1920s, conditions had clearly changed, something not lost on all colonial 
administrators. If the “development” of the population was to proceed in the post-war 
context, the infrastructural development of the colony would have to shift accordingly. In 
the 1920s, the DC of Machakos articulated this position. Writing to the executive 
engineer, he suggested that roads in reserves be built using remunerated labour, noting 
that their main users were non-native populations. While in the period leading up to the 
war, the use of unremunerated labour was justified by its pedagogic function the 
“natives,” he argued, were no longer “raw” and, therefore, the model of labour-as-
pedagogy was no longer appropriate. These two domains of development – civilizational 
and infrastructural – were, according to the DC, out of synch.91  Instead of paying heed to 
these arguments, not to mention the evidence embodied in forms of African resistance, 	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administrators developed increasingly harsh policies directed at governing the 
movements of people. The District Commissioner of Machakos had hit on an important 
shift that would be articulated with increasing poignancy by Africans in the late inter-war 
period.  
Indeed, in 1929 the Kikuyu Central Association for the first time explicitly linked 
the abuses of the kipande system to the forms of marginalization secured through 
circumscribing the movement of people in space. Writing to the Colonial Office, the 
KCA argued that the kipande was used to “restrict the freedom of movement of the 
African Native subjects of the Crown and facilitates efforts to keep them in a state of 
slavery.”92 This sentiment likely underwrote the disobedience campaigns initiated in Fort 
Hall the same year, which were manifest in the popular refusal to engage in communal 
labour. The labour they were refusing, as had historically been the case, was likely 
roadwork. In this same year the DC of Fort Hall noted that unpaid labour on reserve 
roads was the most unpopular form of labour.93 He went on to remark: “The dislike of 
this road work cannot …be very deep considering the innumerable applications which are 
so frequently made by large communities for new roads to be opened up.”94 While there 
was, in the main, a good deal of support for an increase in road networks animated by the 
hope that this would facilitate African trade and capital accumulation, a goal pursued - 
though for different reasons - by both petty capitalists and those “on the road,” these 
desires were in tension with the reality that most roads were designed to extend the reach 
of the surveillance state and to increase settler wealth.  	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Roads and their uses marked the status of the colonized in both racial and 
economic terms, something made abundantly clear when the colonial state refused 
African requests to grow cash crops the postwar period.95 Given the particularities of 
indirect rule in the Kenya colony, roads symbolized unfair labour practices and inter-
communal, specifically inter-generational, struggles over access to wealth and authority. 
Road development had become politicized, with forced labour on roads - in light of the 
relative immobility of populations - increasingly emerging as the terrain upon which 
conflicts concerning where legitimate authority ought to be located were fought. Roads, 
as noted by Rudolf Mrazek in the context of the Dutch Indies were, “from the moment of 
their inception a battlefield and a space” of uncertainty.96 Within this context, the road 
itself emerged as a stand in for both colonial governmentality and a certain envisioning of 
mobile “modernity.” Roads were thus symbolic of “progress” and flow and, concurrently, 
stagnation and blockage. However, the mobility associated with roads had two valances, 
physical, on the one hand, and conceptual, on the other. The routes of rule were at once 
the site of violent labour practices, the infrastructures required for the enrichment of rural 
petty capitalists, and the symbols of a redefined moral economy articulated through 
popular attempts to rework the criterion by which social adulthood was measured. As we 
shall see, in the coming decades these imaginings of the road and technologies of 
mobility would become intertwined in incredibly complex ways. 
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Auto-mobility: The (Ambiguous) Place of Desire in British Colonial Practice 
If a settled area Chief is to do his job, it is essential that he is mobile. This 
means that…he has a Land Rover available.97 
 
According to the logic informing British rule, the cultivation of desire was one step 
toward “civilizing” colonized populations, something the colony’s first Native 
Commissioner, John Ainsworth, brazenly pointed out. According to Ainsworth, a desire 	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for commodities evidenced the relative progress of populations while concurrently (and 
conveniently) further implicating them in colonial capitalism. As we have seen 
remunerated labour was critical to the functioning of the colonial economy but, according 
to Ainsworth, it was Africans' desires for material goods cultivated through “educating 
them to the wants of Western civilisation” that would lead Africans to seek out 
employment. This would, he claimed, render coercion unnecessary, thereby ensuring the 
reproduction of a labouring force.98 Colonial officials (despite their anxieties over 
unsanctioned movement) viewed the desire for technologies of mobility as evidence of 
the relative development of populations, and as evidence of colonials’ relative success as 
civilizers. However, this logic, which linked the fetishization of commodities and 
infrastructures of mobility to the emergence of modern subjectivities, had unexpected 
consequences for colonial governance. 
The entrenchment of the wage-labour economy had, by the mid-1920s, produced 
a subsection of the population possessed of expendable capital. Following Ainsworth’s 
script, Africans increasingly engaged in commodity consumption, reinvesting their wages 
in the colonial economy, focusing in particular on technologies of mobility.  
Luise White notes that by 1928 there were approximately five thousand cars in 
the colony, the majority of which were located in Nairobi and all of which were owned 
by Europeans or Indians.99  However, my evidence suggests that Africans in increasing 
numbers either owned vehicles or fixed their energies on acquiring them by the late teens. 
As early as 1924, colonial officers were reporting African car ownership which, when in 	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the hands of those “loyal” to the state, was reflexively linked to the relative development 
of individual owners. In the same year, the District Commissioner of Fort Hall reported 
the following by way of indexing colonial achievements in the district:  
Before leaving the subject of the Social and Economic development of the Native 
area, mention should be made of the fact that the two most enterprising chiefs of 
the district, Njiri and Muriranja, have bought motor cars, they being the first to do 
so in the district.100 
Two years later, the District Commissioner more directly linked development and 
civilization to the desire for technologies of mobility, the quintessential emblems of 
colonial modernity and authority. In 1926, he reported:  
I have been struck with the general loyalty and desire for co-operation in the great 
 majority of cases. Many of the chiefs are giving an excellent lead to their peoples 
 in things like the purchase of ploughes [sic] and motor lorries and work on roads
 has been pursued with considerable energy and enthusiasm.101 
 
In a self-congratulatory tone, he concluded by noting that there were now 14 native-
owned lorries in the district. Symbols of British superiority, if carefully doled out, would 
ensure the colonial hierarchy was reproduced while reinforcing supposed “native awe” in 
the face of technologies evidencing British power.102 These predictions did not bear out, 
as technologies of mobility became the objects through which competing notions of 
“development” were mediated.  
Africans did not simply desire technologies of mobility as markers of prestige. 
For many, these technologies were emblematic of movement the colonial state, through 
its local proxies, denied. The materiality of these commodities, their capacity to move 
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people through space, in other words, was critical to people’s evaluation of these colonial 
things.103  
In the late teens, the DC of what was then known as Kikuyu Province reported the 
emergence of an informal transportation system in the area:  
There are now some 52 native owned lorries and motor cars in the Province: but 
 the greatest evidence is to be seen in the numbers of passengers carried by 
 omnibuses which now carry people to all parts of the Reserves. In one centre 
 named Kahumoini in the Fort Hall Reserve, an average daily number of eight to 
 ten lorries assemble to take natives to and from Nairobi. European estate owners 
 near the Reserves are beginning to adopt the practice of daily sending lorries in to 
 the Reserve to collect their labourers.104 
 
 
Out of the 52 native-owned motor vehicles operating in the region, 10 were being used to 
transport labouring populations. For obvious reasons, the transportation of the labour 
force was not something the colonial administration bemoaned.  
Access to these technologies had, evidently, put some better-situated individuals 
in a position to access a burgeoning market and the capital rewards such an entry might 
allow. Cars, whether used to enter into trade networks or used for government work (as 
was the case for government-employed drivers), were increasingly associated with wealth 
and a measure of mobile independence.105 The movement of people in this instance 
worked to the advantage of colonial capitalism. However, there was no guarantee that 
Africans would put these re-purposed technologies to the ends sanctioned by the colonial 
state. Officials did not have the means or wherewithal to ensure that it was the right 
people who were moving to the right places, nor could they easily monitor the identities 
of people on the move, their mobility now augmented by technologies of mobility. As we 	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shall see, when these technologies were in the wrong hands African desires were no 
longer read as being wholly unproblematic; indeed, the rhetoric would be partially 
reversed. In the wrong hands, automobility was not cited as evidence of the success of the 
civilizing mission but as evidence of decay.  
    *** 
The colonial state looked on anxiously as Africans in increasing numbers turned 
their energies on acquiring technologies of mobility, putting them to uses that directly 
challenged the authority of the colonial state. While these actions rerouted authority, they 
simultaneously reinscribed the ideological patina that these technologies bore, linking 
autonomous movement to modernity and prestige through the sign-function of the 
vehicle, as the itineraries of two notable figures in Kenya’s history make apparent.106 
When future president of independent Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, traveled the 
country in the 1920s it was by bicycle. In 1948, upon being appointed head of the Kenyan 
Central Association (KCA), this technology of mobility was “upgraded,” the association 
paying for a motorcycle. Possession of these technologies gave Kenyatta unprecedented 
access to the colony, enabling him to spread the messages of the KCA and 
simultaneously acting as material markers of his prestige. According to Jeremy Murray-
Brown: “It was how he was remembered by the boys of Dagoretti: a young man, tidily 
dressed, whose ‘piki-piki’ bike could be heard a long way off chugging up the hill…He 
gave rides to some of them on the back of his bike. His prestige rose accordingly.”107     
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A similar pattern is evident in the early itinerary of well known dissident, Harry 
Thuku. Having received a mission education, Thuku moved to Nairobi in search of work 
in 1905.108 In the teens, Thuku was earning £4 a month working as a telephone operator. 
These wages enabled him to purchase a bicycle. His job as an operator, moreover, put 
him into contact with Indian activists who encouraged Thuku to advocate on behalf of the 
oppressed majority, which he did, deftly moving information along the colony’s arteries 
by bicycle. In 1921, Thuku formed the Young Kikuyu Association, soon renamed the 
East African Association reflecting the multi-ethnic coalition he envisioned. By this time, 
Thuku was travelling the colony by car, extending informational networks across space 
by connecting nodal points of anti-colonial sentiment. Thuku, like Kenyatta, was a prime 
example of the detribalized native the administration had come to fear. While the colonial 
state situated the movement of these men as an expressed threat to colonial rule, citing 
their active campaigning against the worst abuses of colonial authority and the state’s 
local proxies, the administration perceived mobile Africans in general as a threat to 
colonial order. And the administration was not wrong in sensing that Africans in 
increasing numbers were on the move.  
Increasingly, it seems, broader publics conceptualized personal “development” as 
being mirrored in, and marked by, the possession of technologies of mobility. Ainsworth, 
evidently, had not envisioned African consumers desiring precisely those commodities 
that, though further implicating them in colonial capitalism, simultaneously allowed them 
to circumvent the most hated aspects of colonial rule. In particular, those colonial policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 John Lonsdale, “Thuku, Harry” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: In Association 
with the British Academy: From the Earliest Times to the Year 2000, ed. H.C.G. Matthew and 
Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
	   50	  
– of which there were many - that were directed towards tightening the strictures 
governing African mobility.  
Technologies of mobility, as this suggests, were not simply desired for the 
markets they opened up. If, for Kenyatta and Thuku, these technologies allowed them to 
spread a political message and marked their prestige, other sections of the population, 
equally concerned with travel, used them to spread a politics of an altogether different 
kind. Derek Peterson notes that the history of the Revival in East Africa maps quite 
neatly onto the history of the bicycle in the region. Carefully saving wages, Revivalists 
devoted a great deal of energy to acquiring bicycles. In Central Kenya, these men and 
women would have visited the Province’s first African-owned bike shop, which was 
opened in 1926.109 These technologies allowed Revivalists to travel, crossing colonial 
boundaries to attend multi-ethnic meetings and to create and participate in affective 
networks that transcended the (sometimes) narrow parameters of home. Their mobility 
not only allowed them to escape from under the thumb of “traditional” authorities but, 
insofar as they undermined local leaders, their actions posed a direct challenge to indirect 
rule.  
Unable to dictate the uses to which technologies of mobility were put, the colonial 
state attempted to limit their circulation. As early as 1915, colonial officials were 
bemoaning the unmonitored circulation of bicycles within the colony. Responding to 
these concerns, a “Registration and Identification Bill” was passed to stem the tides of 
mobility. As the Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza Province wrote to the Attorney 
General of Nairobi: “the increasing introduction of Bicycles into this Protectorate and the 	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spread of their use into the Native Reserves” had upset colonial imaginings of law and 
order, as “thefts” were “threatening to become common.”110  Metal tickets were to be 
attached to all bicycles, which would “conspicuously” bear the license number of the 
bike. All bicycles, moreover, were to be equipped with a “lighted lamp” between “sunset 
and sunrise.”111 The unsanctioned circulation of technologies of mobility was a 
technological problem for which there was a technical fix; artificial illumination designed 
to ensure that technologies were limited to their “proper” uses.112 Thus while this anxiety 
was articulated as a fear of increased criminality, it was equally an anxiety that pivoted 
on the unprecedented possibility for mobility the circulation of these technologies 
engendered. Indeed, these anxieties were not wholly without merit in the immediate post-
war years.  
Not only were bicycles and lorries circulating in increasing numbers but cars as 
well. Indeed, the number of cars in the protectorate increased tenfold between the years 
of 1922 and 1924 rising from only 134 to 945 in the two-year period.113 Just as urban 
migration was emblematic of the untethering of youth from the authority of their elders, a 
process which directly threatened the colonial state, the possession of technologies of 
mobility was increasingly situated as a powerful symbol of “youthful” insubordination 
and criminality.114 This was not only because of the unsanctioned movement facilitated 
by these technologies but equally because the circulation of these objects coincided with 
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the spread of a language of “rights” which called into question the legitimacy of colonial 
rule.  
As Africans in increasing numbers possessed technologies of mobility, they 
challenged Britons monopoly over quintessential symbols of modernity; symbols that, 
according to the British, were to be carefully doled out not indiscriminately spread. The 
relationship between object and meaning, signified and signifier, the administration was 
learning, was difficult to stabilize and even more difficult to police.115  
Statements made by the DC of Fort Hall (cited above) reflect the increasing 
ambivalence colonial officials felt towards the unmonitored circulation of these 
technologies. In 1925, the DC reported with some anxiety that Mission education had 
produced a generation of young men who fancied themselves “literary types” and 
therefore regarded themselves as being above manual labour.116  That these mission-
educated men had developed their own ideas about the place of technologies of mobility 
in articulating their status as “readers” should not be surprising. The ideology connecting 
knowledge over, and possession of, technologies of mobility was one engendered in the 
teachings of Anglican missionaries. A quiz produced by missionaries stationed in the 
Highlands in the postwar period, for example, led with the following question:  “1. Name 
a modern transport which begins with L.” The answer, “lorry.” From this initial 
benchmark, students were asked three further questions related to their knowledge of 
technologies of mobility, down to some of their basic mechanics.  
Question 7, for example, read: “Part of a Motor-car beginning with C. (clutch, 
carburettor)” (sic). 
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Question 8, “Part of a Motor-car beginning with W.? (Wheel, wiper)”117  
 
Taken individually the items on this test, assembled and preserved in the papers of 
Reverend J.L. Beecher do, indeed, appear to be “sundry matters.” However, these 
questions were set alongside questions of a decidedly more theological nature, questions 
regarding “modern” domesticity, and questions regarding world geography.  Reading the 
list in full, then, suggests the complicated means by which various threads of discourse 
were brought together, cross-referentially producing a robust image of “development,” 
which placed technologies of mobility at its center. 
As Rudolf Marzek writes of late-colonial Dutch rule in the Indies: “the power of 
colonial culture…was in trivialities.”118 In mission schools, everyday technologies – 
heretofore out of the reach of many – were intimately bound up with the ideology of 
“development,” and “civilization,” states to be reached through hard work and further 
education. Christianity here operated as a stand in for civilization, which was connected 
to knowledge of the wider world, and was mediated through knowledge of quotidian 
technologies, specifically those associated with mobility.  To this, Africans added another 
category of practice – leisure.  
It is, then, perhaps not surprising that the DC of Fort Hall made the following 
observation in 1926 regarding the “danger” of educated men. Attending to the causal 
connections among commodity consumption, the constitution of “subversive-types,” and 
everyday practice, is instructive here. “Readers,” he argued: 
constitute a potential danger as, being averse to unskilled manual labour and 
lacking employment, they… tend to sell the ranks of the discontented and 	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seditious. Some of them, the best of them, become teachers at Missions School or 
traders but a large number of them rest on their cars and do nothing.119  
 
Lindsey Green-Simms has argued that these “technological objects articulated the place 
that different bodies would hold on the colonial hierarchy and acted as agents in 
reproducing social orders that were constructed on ideals of difference and exclusion.”120 
However, as we have seen, and as the anxieties shaping colonial policies increasingly 
reflected, these technologies and the authority and prestige associated with them could 
not be wholly protected against appropriation. In the early colonial period, colonial 
officials were to a significant degree able to control movement through space; however, 
they were less able to monitor the purchasing power of Africans whose status as 
consumers was, in part, a consequence of the state’s desire to implicate them in the wage-
labour economy.  
The mobility of dissent is repeatedly confirmed in the colonial record. Bikes, cars, 
and lorries evidently operated somewhat differently from other commodities in colonial 
spaces. While the prestige of these objects constituted an appropriation of British 
imaginings of modernity, the very fact that they enabled movement placed them in a 
unique position to challenge the strictures of colonial rule. The “threat” presented by the 
mobility of these men and women, was not lost on the colonial state, and the 
circumscription of mobility as a tactic of colonial governance was not lost on African 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, as we have seen, and with increasing regularity, issues of mobility 
were the nodes around which anti-colonial activists focused their attentions.  
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Upon Kenyatta’s return from London in 1930, where he had worked to draw metropolitan 
attention to the situation in the colony, the colonial state found its efforts to monitor his 
movements repeatedly frustrated. Colonial officials bemoaned the difficulty of their task, 
repeatedly citing what, in their eyes, was his intentionally clandestine movements. His 
seditious intentions were confirmed for officials by his use of an automobile for transport, 
the autonomy automobility afforded making him practically impossible to track.121 
Concurrent to Kenyatta's return from the metropole, disobedience campaigns 
were an increasingly regular feature of life in Central Province, specifically Fort Hall. As 
the District Commissioner of Fort Hall wrote to the Provincial Commissioner of Nyeri, 
there was no doubt that the authority of the local chiefs was being undermined through 
“an organised campaign of abuse and ridicule.”122 Following a conventional historical 
script, people were also refusing to engage in labour, which, it was noted, “appears at the 
moment to command general sympathy from all who are not themselves chiefs or elders.” 
According to the administrator's report, the dissidents were using strategies that evaded 
the watchful eye of the anxious colonial state. Agitators ridiculed the authority of chiefs, 
held political meetings under the guise of religious gatherings where the position of the 
government was misrepresented, and were falsely representing themselves as government 
tax collectors, using the funds amassed to pay the fines of those who refused to engage in 
compulsory roadwork.123  
While the discontent appeared to be general, the organizers of the disobedience 
campaign were assumed to be members of the Kikuyu Central Association, which was 
widely held to represent the interests of “youth” (again, socially defined). Officials must 	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have guessed that Kenyatta’s clandestine movements were linked to the coordination of 
the campaigns in Fort Hall.  
The colonial discourse on mobility dovetailed with that of elders anxious to retain 
the reigns of power. In Central Province, elders’ critiques of mobility were framed 
through the Kikuyu labour theory of value. Young, mobile men were delinquent, their 
movement represented an affront to landed imaginings of self-mastery and social 
adulthood. Concurrently, access to the wage labour economy provided unprecedented 
avenues for self-mastery defined according to different criteria. These men were, as John 
Lonsdale puts it, “time bandits.”124 Rejecting the spatial logic that linked “self-mastery” 
to landed labour, these men simultaneously undermined a temporal logic that naturalized 
the slow, “traditional” path to social maturation. These men and women transgressed 
normative expectations of the “ethical” occupation of space, thereby upsetting normative 
readings of “developmental” time.  
In light of these unwelcome developments the DC, rehearsing a well-worn 
colonial script, argued it was of the utmost importance that the “best and most loyal 
chiefs” be given free reign in terms of their mobility, arguing not that this would effect 
better surveillance but that it would demonstrate the authority of the chiefs and thus 
increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.125 Just as access to these 
technological objects and the mobility they afforded were used in an earlier era to mark 
the separation between British colonial officers and colonized populations, it was hoped 
that in the context of a changing political economy and shifting cultural terrain a similar 
strategy could be deployed to divide African populations. The dialectics of mobility and 	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immobility were again at play, and the actions of those participating in the disobedience 
campaigns pointed quite directly to this doubling. People would no longer labour on 
routes used by colonial officials to effect discipline. Even more presciently, perhaps, they 
would not labour on the infrastructures of mobility they were not allowed to freely 
traverse. 
As dissidents increasingly engaged in unsanctioned mobility, directing their 
frustrations directly at the routes of rule, the strictures of colonial policy directed at 
circumscribing movement tightened. In 1937, there were increasing complaints that 
kipandes were being unfairly demanded along roadways, where the police stand on “road 
junctions near Native Locations” and demand money as “proof” of “employment.”126 
Individuals caught without their placards at unofficial roadblocks were either arrested or 
were forced to produce bribes. In response to these measures, Africans actively worked to 
thwart the reproduction of asymmetric social relations as they were mediated through 
access to technologies of mobility, and to challenge labour policies which coerced 
Africans into forging the infrastructural routes of rule.  
Interestingly, both stalwarts of surveillance and those more sympathetic to the 
frustrations of Africans invoked automobility in supporting their positions in the face of 
vociferous critiques of the kipande system. Representing the former position, a Provincial 
Commissioner rhetorically asked whether carrying a kipande was any more cumbersome 
than being asked to carry a driver’s licence.127 The opposition challenged this interesting 
analogy, arguing that the predations associated with the kipande system were more akin 
to a scenario wherein: “the European motorist would find himself if, instead of being 	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summonsed [sic] for breaches of traffic bye-laws, was invariably arrested and imprisoned 
for such offenses.”128 Though likely not aware of the prescience of these comparisons, 
both analogies, through their invocations of automobility, tapped into sentiments widely 
held by African critics, who increasingly cited the limits placed on their automobility as 
evidence of their oppression.129  
As we have seen, a number of issues coalesced around these quintessentially 
modern technologies ranging from labour, to struggles over generational rights, to the 
brass tacks of colonial oppression. In using these technologies, not only was a young 
generation able to increase their authority among more remote populations for whom the 
motorbike was “an object of wonder” but, in some cases, the possession of these objects 
acted to reroute authority away from colonial officials and native authorities, placing it in 
the service of dissent. Indeed, in the cases of Thuku and Kenyatta, it was by virtue of the 
mobility afforded by these technologies that the two were not only able to facilitate the 
circulation of ideas but, more concretely, were able to set up chapters of the KCA among 
Embu and Meru communities.130   
To situate these practices as unproblematic evidence of “resistance,” however, 
would be to miss the doubledness of the discourse and practices associated with roads 
and technologies of mobility. While people such as Kenyatta and Thuku were putting 
these technologies to uses deemed undesirable by the colonial state, their capacity to 
acquire technologies of mobility speaks to the success of the colonial state in creating a 
body of wage labourers, and the ever-deeper implication of African populations in 
colonial capitalism. Moreover, men like Kenyatta were engaged in struggles of their own, 	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which ultimately worked to shore up an exclusive vision of masculine adulthood. While 
in this early period automobility was imagined as a means of circumventing colonial 
authority, as the colonial period progressed men such as Kenyatta would increasingly 
appropriate the script shared by colonial officials and “elders,” situating the movement of 
“undesirables” and “loafers” as a threat to constituted authority. Most abstractly, people’s 
desire for, and consumption of, technologies of mobility reinscribed the conceptual link 
among authority, access to automobility, and modernity. In using these technologies, 
their symbolic power was reinscribed even as it was rerouted, a doubling that continues 
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Chapter 3:  
World War II and the Changing Terrain of Mobility  
We will not possibly develop this district without better roads. The report seems 
to put it the other way round – i.e. no money for roads until development has 
taken place and produced revenue.131 
 
The conditions obtaining during the Second World War provided new opportunities for 
movement for variously situated Kenyans. In light of colonial rationing, officials were 
forced to reduce the number of visits made to outlying districts by car, finding themselves 
in an “extremely awkward position,” having to “slow down the tempo in the midst of 
extremely urgent demands for action.”132 Higher-level officials lamented this inability to 
monitor popular sentiment due to reduced communications. District Officers were thus 
advised to make “special efforts during the War to keep in close touch with native 
opinion, correct any false war rumours and give any possible information to the natives 
with a view to allaying anxiety.”133  
Concurrent to this contraction in the surveillance capacities of the state were 
pressing needs to improve communications networks. In particular, infrastructural routes 
were at a premium during the war years and the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) 
became the single largest employer in the colony.134 While much of this labour was 
remunerated, the colonial administration, strapped for cash as it was, devised a new 
strategy to reduce the costs of development, effectively combining the prison system with 
the Public Works Department (P.W.D.). By 1942 the number of people working in road 	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camps was double the number of people imprisoned in Central Province, and 
administrators were thrilled with the results. “The road camps have been an outstanding 
success,” wrote the District Commissioner of Nyeri: 
there have been no disturbances and very few escapes, and the standard of work 
has been high. The experiment is one that deserves to be a permanent feature of 
the prison system...[with the assistance of] the P.W.S. [Public Works 
Service]...This is an industry which should be extended after the war.135 
 
Given wartime conditions, the administration did not feel the need to justify conscription 
by invoking the pedagogic value of road labour and the central place of infrastructural 
networks in achieving “uplift.”  
Under the guise of the “exceptionalism” of the period, however, more insidious 
tendons of the politics of mobility were being tethered. Wartime labour practices 
effectively linked criminality with road labour and, given the number of people who were 
prosecuted for abandoning labour contracts, linked unsanctioned mobility to coercive 
forms of labour that functionally extended the state's surveillance apparatus.136 In other 
words, transgressive spatial practices were connected to forms of labour that increased 
the capacity of the colonial state to monitor space, and the movement of people through 
it. The Janus-faced nature of roads, in both their symbolic and material function, was 
again reaffirmed. They were both the site of arrest, and the site of punishment. Thus, 
while roads had become for many symbols of “development,” they were ever-present 
material evidence of Africans’ status as subjects. These infrastructures were not 
unproblematically associated with mobility; they were routes of rule, not be confused 
with the infrastructures of unencumbered “modern” mobility, a core symbol of the 	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achievements of the industrial west. Despite the claims of the DC there was a hitch in the 
state’s efforts to promote this mangled modernity.   
If prior to the outbreak of the war, colonial authorities were more or less able to 
control how African populations were moving by controlling who had access to 
technologies of mobility (at the very least from the idealized perspective of the state), the 
demands of the war rendered this strategy moot. The introduction of war lorries manned 
by African drivers forced the floodgates which, once opened, were impossible for the 
administration to dam. In 1942 it was reported that Turkana men in large numbers were 
moving across the colony in lorries without the requisite road-passes, taking routes 
unsanctioned and unsurveilled by the colonial state.137 In keeping with the prevailing 
colonial ideology, officials interpreted these movements as reflecting broader shifts in the 
minds of those on the move.  Indeed, in the same year the Provincial Commissioner of 
Central Province reported that Kikuyu were developing a sense of “individuality” which, 
he argued, constituted a palpable threat to colonial authority. Bolstering his claim, the PC 
noted that Kikuyu men were engaging in unsanctioned trade, and that “a good deal of the 
export of commodities is done in Kikuyu-owner lorries.”138  
A number of these people on the move directed their attentions toward the capital 
of Nairobi. The city, for many, represented the possibility for capital accumulation, and 
an escape from the unfair labour practices and the rapacious chiefs, which together 
shaped much of rural life. For a “youthful” population increasingly blocked from 
achieving social adulthood in their home regions, the city represented a space where 
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respectability could be achieved by different means, defined according to newly emergent 
criteria.  
By 1943, it was estimated that there were 64,509 Africans living in Nairobi. 
While the bulk of this population retained connections with family “up-country” many 
viewed Nairobi as home. The Provincial Commissioner of Central Province, following a 
conventional colonial script, was unable to reconcile the ideal of a rural African labour 
force with the “detribalized,” urban African. Although the PC acknowledged that the city 
was viewed by many as being “home,” he contended that the number of those that are 
“completely urbanized is probably not more than 1/15th of the total.”139 The idea of urban 
Africans challenged the conventional colonial wisdom, which held that Africans were 
fundamentally rural people. Officials, therefore, understood African settlement in urban 
spaces as evidence of the disillusion of “traditional” authority. In the face of these threats, 
whether real or imagined, the colonial state initiated policies that functionally 
criminalized the occupation of urban space which, as White notes, was the “state's 
response to a penal code in which most waged and all unwaged work could not be 
criminalized.”140 It was in this spirit that the state promulgated the “Vagrancy Ordinance” 
in 1944, which allowed officials to forcibly return undesirable “denativized” Africans to 
the reserves, marching and sending them by bus along the colony’s arteries.141  
Infrastructures of mobility, however, were not simply symbols and materialities of 
colonial discipline. They, like other technologies of mobility, were doubled. Technical 
knowledge of communications networks provided opportunities for subversion. Indeed, 
1947 was a watershed for the politics of mobility as Africans who were connected to the 	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mobility sector transformed technical knowledge into a poetics of subversion. In 1947 
strikes broke out in Nyanza/Kisumu and Mombasa. In both instances the government 
assumed the culprits were employees of the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) which, 
we will remember, predominantly employed Africans in the roads’ sector, and Railway 
employees. Administrators were certain that key trouble-makers were mobile men, but 
overlaying this generic set of assumptions was the belief that Kikuyu men, in particular, 
were responsible for the shape of the unionists’ politics.142  
Knowledge and politics, like “youthful” men and women, evidently traveled, and 
it was the very fact of these unsanctioned mobilities that gave them such conceptual 
weight in the minds of colonial officials. In the case of the strike in Kisumu, officials 
were careful to note the presence of Kikuyu men at the site of the trouble in the 
predominantly Luo and Luhya region, whereas in the case of Mombasa, the 
administration noted that striking workers were articulating the complaints that typified 
those emanating from Africans living in Central Province: land alienation, unfair wages, 
and the inability to accumulate capital.143 Beyond the anxiety provoked by “Kikuyu 
participation,” strikers’ ability to ply the colony’s routes and spread their message gave 
the strikes a palpably threatening hue. As the author of a confidential circular warned: “If 
the strike has repercussions up-country this may be expected to give a new lease of life to 
the strike down here, and still more, if the strike down here continues to be successful, it 
may lead to, or accelerate, events up-country.”144  
Officials were correct in their concern that these men, with technical knowledge 
of the functioning of communications networks and an understanding of the coordination 	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required to render them operational, could grind the colonial economy to a halt. The skills 
designed to ensure smooth operations were, indeed, the selfsame skills required to create 
blockage. The complex and mobile itineraries of people and ideas were fearsome things, 
near impossible to discipline and totally opaque to the surveillance apparatus of the state. 
The surest solution, officials speculated, was to raise a “non-native” force of volunteers 
to “keep the Railway and Post-Office working” for should another strike occur, “it is 
probable that they will do their utmost to stop the railway working and they may even 
attempt to break telephonic and telegraphic communications.”145  
People were not, in this instance, engaging the politics of mobility by refusing to 
labour on infrastructural routes of rule. Urban-based Africans, by contrast to their rural 
counterparts, targeted technologies of mobility over which they possessed a special 
mastery. These instantiations of colonial governance required skilled labourers and, like 
the technologies themselves, these skills could be put to unforeseen, “seditious” ends. 
Colonial authority, from this perspective, was contingent on the structures that sustained 
it, and this contingency made it vulnerable to subversion.  
The increased political activities of urban labourers forced the colonial state to 
acknowledge that mobile, urbanized Africans were not an aberration. Nor were their 
networks limited to the urban cores of Nairobi, Kisumu, and Mombasa. Urban workers 
employed in the mobility sector had networks cutting across the colony and played a 
critical role in fomenting dissent on a large scale during the 1947 strikes, moving ideas as 
well as people across Kenya. Within this context, the solution could no longer be to 
return Africans to the reserves. Rather than containing dissent, rehabilitating “natives” to 
rural regions might abet the spread urban-based political movements to the countryside. 	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As the Municipal African Affairs Officer wrote to the Provincial Commissioner of Nyeri 
in 1946, the recent unpopularity and “odium” with which the urban population viewed 
the police and the Labour Department would complicate the removal of vagrants. Beyond 
this he warned that it was:  
necessary to control those Africans who have no other home but Nairobi, and at 
 the same time to prevent the Reserves being troubled by the same conditions 
 under which we are at present suffering through the presence of undesirable 
 Africans.146 
 
Perhaps the fact of mobility and the occupation of the urban space had shaped these men, 
but a return to “traditional” homelands under the supervision of “elders” would not 
reverse these trends. In other words, administrators increasingly viewed these urban-
based Africans as having been “de-nativized” to the point of no return. And yet the 
administration was unwilling to grant these men and women the status of modern urban, 
subjects.147 
The politics of mobility were not limited to urban Africans, and the pitch of 
colonial anxieties during the strike was likely animated by the developments that had 
been taking place in “Kikuyuland” since the war’s end. The war had set people in motion 
which spurned their desire for ever-greater access to mobility and the technologies that 
facilitated it. This was most evident in the demands being put to District administrators 
by returning Askaris who articulated their rights in a language that linked mobility to 
capital accumulation mediated through the sign-function of the automobile. These new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 KNA - PC/CP.20/1 
147 Frederick Cooper, “Urban Space, Industrial Time, and Wage Labor in Africa,” in Struggle for 
the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, and the State in Urban Africa, ed. Frederick Cooper, 7-50, 
(Beverley Hills: SAGE Publications, 1983); Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard. 
“Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997). 
	   67	  
politics demanded new associations, such as the driving association started by returning 
Askaris in Kitui, of which the DC wrote: 
 It is the ambition of very large numbers of askarix [sic] with accumulated funds, 
which were beyond their wildest dreams of wealth five years ago, to either 
 purchase a lorry or to set up trade as a means of increasing their resources. For the 
 meantime both these ambitions must be restrained and lists of would-be vehicle 
 owners are being compiled against the day when a partial fulfillment of their 
 ambitions may be possible.148  
  
Similar patterns were noted in Meru. Administrators argued for the need to restrain 
desires for automobility until the time was right. From the point of view of would-be 
lorry owners, however, their service to the Crown ought to be rewarded, and the reward 
they desired was the unencumbered mobility and capital accumulation afforded by these 
commodities.149 Technologies of mobility thus occupied important material as well as 
conceptual place for returning Askaris. Not only were they perceived to be critical 
prerequisites for capital accumulation but also marked their bearers as “modern,” 
respectable men.  
In both domains – the symbolic and the material – the desire for greater access to 
automobility constituted an attempt to reconfigure the topography of power in the Kenya 
colony. As the DC of Kiambu reported in the same year:  
  
 There has been brisk demand for lorries for every conceivable trade; in view of 
 the difficulties over tyres, spares and petrol applications have not been given 
 except in essential cases. All sorts of old scrap iron that was once a box body car 
 or a lorry have been retried in attempts to get them on the road. The freight sought 
 after is ostensibly fuel, vegetables or charcoal but it is in practice the much 
 higher-paying human being. The Kikuyu do not seem to understand the saying 'is 
 your journey really necessary? And think nothing of paying a Shs/4 – lorry fare to 
 sell Shs 3/- worth of vegetables or eggs and see the sights of Nairobi. Most of the 
 trade is in native hands and there would seem to be far too many traders to ever 	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 hope to make a decent living.150 
 
Given the historical premium the state put on the unencumbered mobility of colonial 
agents in a bid to create a robust surveillance state, and the role of automobiles in shoring 
up colonial authority and prestige, this statement would have rung hollow for many.151 
While the DC had limited understanding of the myriad economic activities and exchange 
relationships facilitated by trips to town, the journey itself was likely part of travelers’ 
calculus. For people willing to expend more than they gained on these trips to Nairobi, it 
seems, the fact of movement often took precedence over the desire to accumulate wealth.  
However, there was another, more local form of politics at play here. Though not 
stated in the report, it is likely that the bulk of town traders were women, who had 
cornered the market in vegetable sales by the mid-1930s.153 Just as young men marked 
their autonomy from the strictures of rural authority by going to the city and entering into 
the wage-labour economy, now women struck out on their own asserting their relative 
autonomy from brothers, husbands, and fathers.154 As this suggests, the desire for 
technologies of mobility was not limited to the possible markets such movement 
facilitated but were part of a larger discourse which connected mobility to emergent and 
alternative imaginings of self-mastery.155  
Unencumbered automobility and the markets afforded by lorry-ownership were 
not the only concerns of drivers, as is evident from a survey of the politics of driving 
associations formed at the war’s end. In 1945 two political activists established driving 
associations. James Beauttah, then head of the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.), 	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formed the Kenya African Automobile Association and Francis Khamisi, editor of 
“Mwalimu,” headed up a group “styling themselves as the Thika Motor Drivers 
Association.”156 Beauttah hoped to enlist all African lorry owners as members, creating a 
platform from which their interests and the needs of their customers could be protected. 
Beauttah, however, was as concerned as elders regarding the mobility of “youth,” and the 
untethering from traditional authority their movement constituted. His politics, like those 
of Kenyatta, looked increasingly like Kikuyu ethnic patriotism in the post-war years.157   
Khamisi, by contrast, was more broadly concerned with the general plight of 
black Africans, and took his own role as organizer a step further than the conservative 
Beauttah. In 1945, the DC of Thika wrote of labour unrest in the region, which he blamed 
on Khamisi’s group. The drivers complained that they were often brought up on charges 
related to the road-worthiness of vehicles that they did not own, arguing it was not their 
responsibility to maintain vehicles they drove, but the responsibility of the “mainly 
Indian” owners. It was on the basis of these grievances that Khamisi had approached the 
DC and asked that the association to be registered as a trade union.158 In the coming 
months, the Association demanded that the government produce a list of offenses drivers 
could be held accountable for “so that drivers know what is and what is not an offence, as 
they complain of unjustified interference and persecution by the Police.”159 The role of 
police in impeding movement, of course, had historical precedents. So, too, were people 
familiar with officers committing semi-official extortion along the colony’s arteries. Read 
against this longer history of mobility and roads discourse these statements thus become 	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legible as a deep and enduring critique of a colonial system that pivoted on controlling 
people’s movements through space, and reveal an acute understanding of the relationship 
between race and the politics of mobility in the Kenya colony. 
Indeed, drivers’ rights were, for Khamisi, intimately related to the politics of 
mobility, writ large. Following the 1945 labour unrest in Thika, Khamisi published a 
searing critique of the kipande system in “Mwalimu.” This critique directly cited the role 
of space in (re)producing glaring social inequalities in the Kenya colony.  
We are glad to note in Mwalimu...H.E. The Governor's words that he should have 
impression of his finger prints taken in order to possess the card which is given to 
the Africans in Kenya. If it is true that he is going to get the Kipande then he must 
fulfill its regulations. First of all he must change his colour, he must become a 
Blackman and never again be a white man, because Kipande is for the Africans in 
Kenya only. He will be obliged to walk along the River Road for that is the proper 
road for Kipande people. He must halt, when is ordered by Police, in order to 
produce his Kipande to them when they require it. If possible when H.E. Gets his 
Kipande, he must let us see it, so that we can compare his with ours. The 
Governor must prove the following, Clan, Circumcision age, Nature of Work, 
Sub-locations, Location, Name of Employer, Rate of Wages, If posho given, 
Chief, etc.”160  
 
Khamisi was well aware of the multiple ways in which structural marginalization was 
reproduced and the kipande was the core symbol of the colonial state’s attempt to 
circumscribe mobility. Most immediately, the limitations imposed by the system were 
felt in the prohibitive spatial logic they entailed. Those in possession of the kipande 
clearly understood the system’s role in dictating which spaces they could occupy, and 
which roads they could move along. River Road, importantly one of the few roads people 
refer to by name in the postcolonial context, was the “proper road for Kipande people.”  
As colonial anxieties over resistance to the registration system reached a new 
pitch, Jomo Kenyatta was again on the scene. Like Khamisi and Beauttah, Kenyatta’s 	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politics were deeply connected to the politics of mobility. In 1947, District 
Commissioners in Central Province bemoaned the inability of the surveillance apparatus 
to monitor the activities of Kenyatta, who was again travelling across the province by car, 
this time with Peter Mbui. Despite these frustrations, officials did have intelligence that 
the two were holding meetings with motor-vehicle owners who had “no recognised 
association or union of their own.” While the content of these meetings was not clear to 
the administration, the District Commissioner did have intelligence which suggested that 
“they discussed T.L.B. [Transport Licensing Board] licences.”161  
Kenyatta’s concern over the rights of drivers was intimately connected to the 
politics of the Kenya African Union (K.A.U.), a largely middle-class association of 
lettered “youth.”162 Within months, meetings were held across the Province. The 
Superintendent of Police submitted a confidential report to the Provincial Commissioner 
of Central Province, which documented a meeting held under the auspices of the Nyeri 
chapter of the K.A.U. During the meeting, Kenyatta gave a speech, which directly linked 
the structural inequalities that characterized colonial govermnentality to infrastructural 
marginalization. Over the course of the speech Kenyatta, unsurprisingly, demanded the 
abolition of the hated kipande system. Following this condemnation, Kenyatta 
immediately turned to roads and cars. Just as the kipande system denied the personhood 
of the possessor, the nature of road-development denied capital accumulation for African 
automobile owners. “Roads serving European farms,” he pointed out, “were always better 
than Reserve roads. According to him this meant additional expense to African owners of 
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motor vehicles and the money thus spent went back to the European.”163 If the kipande 
system symbolized the worst abuses of the colonial system, it found a material 
counterpart in infrastructural (under)development, which prevented the enrichment of 
rural penny capitalists. Within this context, Kenyatta positioned the dismantling of one 
form of exclusion as capable of unraveling the other.  
Alongside the issue of infrastructural underdevelopment, were problems of 
everyday forms of extortion. The kipande system was emblematic of the circumscription 
of movement; however, even absent these concerns Africans were marked by virtue of 
their race as bodies to be blocked and extorted. These connections were made more 
explicit at a well-attended meeting of the Nairobi Taxi Drivers' Union, where Kenyatta 
was also in attendance. A number of speakers argued that the Municipal Rules governing 
taxi-drivers were tantamount to slavery, and the tone was decidedly revolutionary. As one 
Said from Mombasa put it: “unless the bye-laws [sic] were rejected they would be in 
slavery and that freedom could not be got as a gift from a friend but by blood.” A Somali 
man attacked the by-laws forcing taxi-drivers to wear badges. The badges, he argued, 
were like “dog collars” and, given the symbolic servitude that inhered in the system of 
marking, “they [African taxi-drivers] might just as well be called dogs.”164 The reader 
will be struck by the resonance between these articulations and the critiques that had 
historically been leveled at the kipande system more broadly. Drivers, newly in 
possession of technologies of mobility, were being denied the movement these 
technologies held out as a promise. When Kenyatta asked the crowd what they would do 
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if the laws were not abandoned, they responded they would strike, not only in Nairobi but 
across the colony.  
Dismissing the claims made by the Nairobi Taxi Driver's Union as silly, for did 
these “stupid people” not know that “taxi-cabs in London and New York are very much 
governed by regulations,” a Member for Law and Order was forced to acknowledge the 
significance of the gathering. “The serious feature of that meeting was not only that they 
appear to have passed a resolution rejecting the Municipal Bye-laws with regard to taxi-
cab drivers, but rejecting also the laws of the Kenya Government generally 'as they 
contain no freedom for Africans.'”165 Luise White notes, taxi drivers: 
occupied a position in the world of individuated labor that has sometimes been 
ascribed to domestic servants: they were for the most part skilled illiterates who 
worked closely enough to Indians and Europeans to become acutely aware of the 
political issues and disparities in standards of living.166  
 
For these men, politics writ large were filtered through the politics of mobility, and the 
technologies that formed their core. Anti-colonial sentiment, evidently, increasingly 
found expression in discussions that pivoted around automobility.  
As police exploitation of the kipande system reached an unprecedented pitch in 
the war years, ever more vociferous demands for its abolition reverberated across the 
colony. It was as though even the flawed colonial logic that informed the registration 
system had been abandoned as “the lower ranks of the Police...required [Africans] to 
produce their Registration Certificates...on many occasions [Africans] being fined even 
when going about on their lawful occasions, or in many cases, while on their own 
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premises.”167 It seems that the “lower ranks of the Police” had recognized the system as 
one rife with opportunities for extortion. The link between government authority, 
rapacious law-enforcement agents, and (im)mobility was again being inscribed in 
landscape of the Kenya colony, a legacy that continues to have purchase on postcolonial 
readings of (il)legitimate authority and the location of power.  
In response to the increasingly virulent critiques people were articulating in 
various registers, the colonial state took the first steps to reforming the hated kipande 
system. These reforms sanctioned the separation of the top and bottom halves of the 
identification card, the top identifying the individual subject and the bottom their labour 
history. Though people now had the right to carry the two pieces separately, 
administrators warned against this by mobilizing a revealing, if cynical, analogy. The PC 
of Garissa wrote:   
Regarding the lower half of the kipande, it is not compulsory for you to keep it, 
BUT think carefully before you throw it away…Before you buy a bicycle in a 
shop, you look at it careful, and want to know where it was made, and all about it. 
Likewise, your employer likes to know what kind of person he is engaging, and 
your record of service tells him.168  
 
Ignoring the obvious racism of this statement, which likened human beings to 
manufactured articles, commodities to be bought and sold whose value could be 
determined by the determining the conditions of their origin, we can assume that the PC 
was thoughtful in his choice of analogy given the stakes. In choosing his words, the PC 
must have thought that the analogy would be a compelling one to his audience. 
Technologies of mobility, as we have seen, were valued objects, objects that had 
historically reflected the prestige of their bearers. Certainly people would understand 	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employers’ desire to scrutinize labourers just as Africans scrutinized the commodities 
their participation in the self-same economy allowed them to consume.  
What may not have been clear to the PC, however, was that by likening the 
kipande system to the purchase of a bicycle he was tapping into a fraught discourse of 
mobility which had a long and contentious history among variously situated African 
subjects. Even those with expendable capital were not necessarily permitted to own 
technologies of mobility. And ownership certainly did not entail the right to autonomous 
and unencumbered movement. These technologies were doubled in their symbolic and 
material functions. The objects themselves were emblematic of a type of mobility; 
however, in African hands the mobility promised by these technologies was in no way 
guaranteed.  
The experiences of taxi and lorry drivers mirrored, in microcosm, the oppression 
of black Kenyans more generally. Indeed, when it came time for Kenyatta to speak, he 
explicitly linked the fight against the by-laws to the fight against the kipande system. The 
politics of mobility had been a core site of contestation since the early colonial period. 
Within this discourse, the kipande emerged in popular readings of colonial 
governmentality as the object designed to fix people in place. By the late 1940s, 
technologies of mobility were well entrenched in the popular imaginary as a means of 
circumventing the oppressive and exclusionary policies of the colonial state. However, 
now in possession of these technologies, drivers found their rights to mobility again 
frustrated, as by-laws materially marked their bearers as subjects. While in theory auto-
mobility represented unencumbered movement, in practice the realization of that mobility 
depended on the identity of the driver. Arguably, it is a result of the theoretically inverse 
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relationship between seemingly discrete types of objects – the kipande and municipal by-
laws as stand ins for stasis and oppression, technologies of mobility and tarmacked roads 
as stand ins for movement and a type of freedom - that has transformed technologies of 
mobility into such powerful symbols. These seemingly discrete objects and this particular 
system of governance shared as their canvas, as their site, roads. It is a function of the 
contradictions embedded in these infrastructures and the technologies that traverse them, 
that has transformed these objects into core nodes of struggle and contestation, which 
continue to shape the politics of the present.   
The PC of Nyeri, it would seem, was correct. Controlling the movement of people 
and ideas was no longer a feasible strategy for the colonial government. And, as we have 
seen, the discourse that linked communications networks and power was not limited to 
trade unions and mobility sector workers. Perhaps operating in a different register, the 
quotidian politics of mobility during this period nevertheless spoke directly to the 
intimate relationships that had developed in the popular imaginary among mobility, 
technologies, and the exercise of arbitrary power. Likely contributing to this proliferation 
was the initiation of another phase of expropriation, another attempt by the colonial state 
to inscribe ideal social relationships into the landscape of the colony. In the face of this 
new spatial violence, squatters added their voices to the contentious and multivalent 
politics of mobility.  
     *** 
Following their 1947 eviction from Olengurone, squatters agitated for the right to 
return to land they had worked so hard to clear. In the face of settler, official, and “elder” 
obstinance, each differently arguing the squatters return to the “slavery” of the Highlands, 
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squatters began swearing oaths of unity, hoping mass refusal would force the hand of the 
settlers and the government. As their discontent reached a new pitch, the squatters 
invaded the governor’s house.169 Following the invasion, the Superintendent of Police in 
Central Province reported the following:  
A plain-clothes constable...overheard eight Kikuyu talking in an omnibus in Thika  
township. They were discussing the recent 'invasion' of Government House by 
Rift Valley squatters and the death of one of those squatters on the return journey 
due to a lorry-turning. They said that the over-turning of the lorry was due to 
Police motor vehicles 'weaving' about on the road in front of it. They also said 
that the squatters concerned had contributed to a fund to enable the question of 
this man's death to be taken up with the government.170 
 
And the gossip was not limited to Thika. The DC of Kiambu similarly reported that this 
incident was a topic of heated discussion on the reserve in his district. In Kiambu, rumor 
had it that:  
the police had engineered the accident either by bribing the driver of the lorry, or 
by ordering him to drive at an excessive speed, or by putting another vehicle on 
the road so that the driver had to mount the bank to avoid hitting it.171  
 
These rumors, it was assumed, had as their source Kikuyu political agitators. Their point 
of origin is of less concern to our discussion than the fact that these stories were stories 
that circulated. Whether or not they were “true,” the shape of the narrative was, evidently, 
not beyond the realm of the thinkable for people (re)working these stories as they moved 
them across space.172 The same report noted that a party of 10 men and 19 women had 
visited the site of the accident and spent a good deal of time “making notes and taking 
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measurements.”173 As the forensic work proceeded the crowd grew, reaching upwards of 
100 people who demanded compensation for the survivors of the crash. The most vocal 
of the group was one Ibrahim Gichirire, a lorry owner and advocate for squatters’ rights. 
Despite administrators’ best efforts to quash these emergent politics, meetings continued 
to be held in the following days, as people gathered at the home of an unnamed lorry 
owner. The large-scale political mobilizations of the Coast and Western Province, which 
linked nodes of dissent using technologies of mobility, found more local counter-parts 
amongst the squatters and lorry-owners of Central Province. 
The rumors circulating in and around Thika suggest roads discourse had another 
patina, pointing to another set of doubled meanings. Police did not only extort people 
along the colony’s arteries. It was also along the roads that police conspired to murder 
athami, “people on the move,” using technologies of mobility as their weapon.174 By the 
same token, however, technologies of mobility and the conversations that happened in 
and around them provided people an unprecedented opportunity to circumvent the 
surveillance state. Indeed, as we have seen, political organization and popular protests 
thrived around people in the transport sector as owners and drivers used their status (and 
likely capital) to challenge the security forces’ exercise of arbitrary power. Neither 
wholly positive nor wholly negative, these scenes suggest that, even from this early 
moment, the motor vehicle occupied a highly fraught, contested, and ambivalent space is 
the popular imaginary. Just as in the early colonial period roads were both objects of 
desire and, concurrently, the site where labourers perished, in the post-war period 
vehicles both represented opportunity for self-mastery and the possibility of violent 	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death. In spite of this doubledness in the imaginaries of many Kenyans, one thing was 
clear to the colonial state, these unmonitored vehicles had become loci of discussion, 
sites of gossip and, due to the very fact of their mobility, moving containers for talk.  
Land scarcity was on the forefront of the minds of many in the postwar years and 
the discourse surrounding roads remained part of this narrative. Just as the taxi drivers’ 
union linked new by-laws to their relative marginalization in the colonial hierarchy, 
people living in the reserves continued to view roads as infringing on their liberty. In 
1948, Njeroge Kagunda, both a squatter himself and an advocate for squatters’ rights, 
reportedly forbade Kikuyu from undertaking any government work, “such as road 
repair.”175 Roads in this period were viewed by many as a way of encroaching on the 
already stretched land that had been allotted to Africans living in the Central Province. 
This was confirmed in 1948 with the passing of a new Roads Bill. Land alienated to 
make way for new roads, the Bill stated, would not be compensated. The language 
establishing legitimate use was equally prohibitive. People were forbidden from erecting 
thereon: “any building, structure, fence, wall, ditch, drain, furrow, advertisement, traffic 
sign or other obstacle.” Roads, the circular made clear, could not be repurposed as sites of 
trade and commerce.176 These were not routes that extended markets. 
Resistance, it would seem, did not simply take the form of refusing roadwork. 
Rather, in this period, people actively worked to dismantle the routes of colonial rule.  
And Africans resistant to the development of new roads were not wrong in their belief 
that the building of new roads was a means by which further land would be taken from 
them, nor were they wrong in the related belief that new roads would not provide access 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 KNA - MA/8/111 
176 KNA - PC/RVP.6 
	   80	  
to markets. The prohibited practices enumerated in the Bill suggest protest was taking 
forms which concretely reclaimed these alienated spaces. The report enumerated the acts 
which could be prosecuted as follows: the removal of any “pegs, marks, posts, poles or 
other objects used in connection with a survey”; practices that “willfully deface, 
obliterate, mutilate, break, displace or destroy any such peg, mark, post, pole or other 
object.” Those found guilty were “liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand shillings or 
to imprisonment not exceeding three months, or to both.”177 The sheer length and 
specificity of prosecutable offences suggests that these practices were not uncommon and 
that they took myriad forms.  
Writing of the Grassfields region of Cameroon, Nikolas Argenti argues that the 
destruction of roads in the colonial period was: “something more than an attack against 
the colonial administration and something less than an anticolonial struggle in the strict 
sense.”178 In the Grassfields, these practices were as much a reflection of inter-
generational conflict and the inability of young men to achieve social adulthood as they 
were anticolonial in character. The same could be argued of Kenya. Men like Kenyatta 
were increasingly conservative in their views. As wealthy, landed figures of authority 
these men viewed roads as being the prerequisite for capital accumulation which, 
theoretically, would be reinvested in land. For athami, by contrast, increased road 
development simply meant increased alienation of already over-stretched land. The 
Kikuyu labour theory of value posited landed status as the litmus test of social maturity. 
As this theory articulated with the colonial economy “junior” men and women were 
relegated to the status of perpetual marginalization and stunted maturation as structural 	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constraints blocked conventional routes to self-mastery. The greatest threat to this 
ideology came from the “time bandits,” men and women who eschewed conventional 
criteria of self-mastery by seeking out new markets and forging new sites of sociality in 
town. 
 To say that roads discourse simply pitted colonial populations against the state, 
then, would be to miss the density of meaning and multivalent nature of the discourse. 
Discussions of roads and cars tapped into long contested definitions of respectability and 
challenged conventional criteria of social adulthood. Indeed, it was precisely the fact that 
roads and the technologies that traversed them occupied such a multivalent and often 
highly ambiguous conceptual space that made (and continues to make) roads such a 
resonant and charged political idiom. They were (and are) positively and negatively 
coded depending on the particularities of the context, and could be (and are) often coded 
as both simultaneously. 
Roads and labour practices, cars and capital, identification placards and badges, it 
would seem, found in each other mirrors. They were multiply situated refractions of the 
same “colonial situation,” marked as it was by a form of governmentality that materially 
pivoted on the organization of space and populations within it, but which symbolically 
depended on the semiotics of prestige in shoring colonial authority in the context of 
indirect rule. The Janus-faced nature of these technologies and networks, which were at 
once sources of oppression and markers of emancipation, while beginning to coalesce in 
the discourses of the inter-war period, have become completely fused in the post-colonial 
context.   
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Chapter 4:  
The 1950s Revisited and the Place of Movement in the Politics of Dissent  
When everything goes so splendidly, why cannot I get a permit for my bycicle.' 
[sic]179 
 
I have no interest in entering into the heated ongoing debates in the scholarship over the 
origins of Mau Mau nor in its appropriate categorization, issues which have dominated 
Kenya’s historiography. However, I would suggest that Mau Mau, and colonial responses 
to it, take on a slightly different colour when set against the backdrop of this longer 
history of (im)mobility.  
As we have seen, colonial rhetoric surrounding African mobility, in general, and 
the discourse surrounding the activities of those Africans in contact with technologies of 
mobility, in particular, pivoted on the contradictory demands of colonial capitalism and 
the ideology underwriting development discourse, a tension exacerbated with the 
revitalization of “development” under the guise of “social welfare” in the post-war 
period.180 For the colonial and settler economy to function labour had to circulate but 
movement had to be measured. Setting a labouring population in motion, however, had 
unintended consequences. Indeed, the post-war period was a watershed moment in the 
politics of mobility, as men and women on the move played critical roles in the 
production of dissent. The colonial state presumed people working in the transport sector 	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were to blame, and these associational groups were functionally ethnicized. At fault were 
mobile, Kikuyu “troublemakers.” While in an earlier period, Africans’ desires for roads 
and technologies of mobility were framed as evidence of their relative “development,” by 
the post-war period it was clear to the colonial state that these desires, when realized, 
could be highly volatile. Thus, while cars and road infrastructures remained signifiers of 
development and modernity, the interwar period demonstrated that their function and 
meaning could be subject to radical reinterpretation.  
    *** 
While Mau Mau is typically framed as a Kikuyu conflict that largely broke down 
along the lines of generation and status, some of the core issues were generalizable. John 
Lonsdale, writing of Mau Mau guerillas, argues they were fighting for wiathi, a concept 
he glosses as “self-mastery” and “moral agency.”181 As we have seen, young men and 
women, blocked from the realization of self-mastery along conventional routes, had long 
experimented with methods to achieve respectability according to new criteria. The 
realization of self-mastery had, for some, become associated with the unencumbered 
movement technologies of mobility signified, even if popular experiences using them 
were slightly more problematic. While this experience was not limited to Kikuyu 
“youth,” due to the proximity of Kikuyuland to Nairobi, many of the men and women on 
the road were, indeed, Kikuyu. In the early colonial period, men of Kenyatta’s generation 
had demanded the right to hold the reigns of power, citing literacy and their broader 
experiences of mobility as evidence of their political “maturity.” By the 1950s, this 	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generation of literate men reaffirmed their positions in a newly reconfigured, but 
nonetheless normative, generational hierarchy, separating their youthful spatial 
transgressions from their itineraries as Christian converts, disparaging the former and 
thereby redeeming the latter.182 In other words, they used their literacy to affirm their 
positions within generational and class hierarchies while denying the mobile histories that 
precipitated these transformations.  
 These contradictions were not lost on newly disenfranchised “youth,” who 
viewed men of Kenyatta’s stature and generation as outmoded, not to mention 
hypocritical. It was these men, the men of the KCA, who were now impeding members of 
anake wa forti, the “Forty Group” from achieving self-mastery. A radical critique was 
embedded in this self-designation. They were the “unmarried warriors,” who came up in 
the year 1940, a year by which in an ideally imagined past they should have graduated 
into social adulthood via marriage and propertied status.183 This name, then, spoke to a 
perversion of the unfolding of time - interestingly, an accusation invoked by rural 
patriarchs in their denunciation of the spatial cum temporal transgressions of the anake 
wa forti. The once radical KCA had become an elders’ association.184 Recycling and 
reinvigorating an old script, the KCA now referred to these mobile entrepreneurs as 
people of the “road,” “time-bandits,” who “mixed up the sequence of personal moral 
growth…[and] repudiated ancestry.”185 
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On one reading, then, Mau Mau could be situated as the culmination of a series of 
historical repetitions. As in the 1920s, the politics of the late 1940s, and 1950s pivoted on 
the question of social maturation and hinged on explorations of novel paths by which to 
achieve it. Likewise, the colonial state’s response represented an extension of pre-
Emergency tactics of governance. In particular, the colonial state quickly mobilized 
infrastructures and technologies of containment and purification: the general internment 
of populations in detention camps (which were the emergency era equivalent to native-
reserves), the requisite pass-books (which could be read as more constrictive kipandes), 
Operation Anvil which sanctioned the rounding up of all Kikuyu, Embu and Meru 
populations living in Nairobi (which could be likened to the Vagrancy Ordinance of a 
decade earlier). The practices of the colonial state during the Emergency, like the 
insurgency itself, in other words, found models in earlier practices and vexed processes 
that had historically formed the core of the “colonial situation” in the Kenya colony. And 
space and mobility, like in earlier iterations, formed the crux of the conflict. What was 
unfolding was not simply a repetition, however. While landed, rural men continued to 
refer to impoverished and mobile youth as “delinquent,” the reality was that by 1950: 
“more and more Kikuyu were excluded from the means of production and self-mastery 
by inequality rather than idleness.”186 
 Nevertheless, it would be folly to assume that these repetitions did not shape 
people’s responses to the 1950s regulations. The passbooks, like the kipande, engendered 
an incredibly restrictive spatial logic. As though in symmetrical response to the shape of 
colonial regulations, methods of “passive resistance” were directed toward confounding 
the technopolitics of the state, and communications networks became a central target of 	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popular actions. In particular, people worked to block the movement of the economy. 
Strategies included: “Parking vehicles on bridges and refusing to move them...Lying or 
sitting in large numbers [on] rail tracks, roads, bridges, town centres, airfields etc.”187 If 
the colonial government was going to revoke the already negligible right to mobility of 
African bodies, Africans responded in kind, using their bodies and captured colonial 
technologies to stop of the flow of the colonial economy.  
While the emergency measures were by and large directed at Kikuyu, Embu, and 
Meru (KEM in the colonial shorthand), the administration feared that the uprising would 
spread, leading to widespread surveillance across the Kenya colony.188 In response to the 
increasingly stringent strictures sanctioned by the colonial state, people set to work 
appropriating infrastructures reserved for the state and repurposing them. In a kind of 
seesaw logic, the state responded in kind and enacted increasingly prohibitive spatial 
policies. In 1957, the Emergency Regulations were amended, empowering the police to: 
“regulate the extent to which any music may be played, or to which music or human 
speech or any other sound may be amplified, broadcast, relayed or otherwise reproduced 
by artificial means, on public roads or streets, or at places of public resort.”189  
Strategies developed by union-workers within the transportation sector in the 
1940s, it would seem, were echoed in popular responses to the Emergency regulations of 
the 1950s. These actions not only worked to achieve disruption through creating 
blockages, but also sought to appropriate spaces which historically evidenced colonial 
authority thereby subverting their symbolic meaning.190 Occupying roads and creating 	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spaces of amplified critique transformed routes of surveillance and settler trade into sites 
where colonial discipline was flouted and capital was arrested.  
The idioms of flow and blockage, we would do well to remember, are critical to 
how individual and social wellbeing is conceptualized among many African societies. 
Like in circulatory systems, “flow” is associated with productive sociality, evidence of 
social relations aligned. But it always contains as its potential other stagnation, as a clot 
blocking an artery. These blockages, the result of disequilibrium in the social body, are 
often associated with anti-social forms of power such as witchcraft.191 However, the back 
and forth between blockage and flow operates dialectically. That is, it is in the resolution 
of blockage that social equilibrium can be restored. Blockage is then not only negatively 
coded, but can also be productive of critique and resolution. Thus, in blocking the flow of 
the economy people worked as an anti-social force, inserting themselves into the social 
body of the colonial state, perhaps trying to find resolution.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly sites of mobility, the decided other of Emergency 
regulations, emerged in this period as critical locations of dissent, as the itinerary of the 
KBS (Kenya Bus Service) makes clear.192 The KBS – a metropolitan firm – had 
ostensibly secured a monopoly on transport from the colonial government in Nairobi in 
the 1930s; however, the security of its position, as we shall see, was under constant and 
popular threat. In 1953 Randall D. Warden Jr., a Nairobi resident, wrote a letter of 
complaint to the company regarding the transformation of bus stages into sites of African 
sociality.193 “Dear Mrs. Needham Clark,” he wrote:  
In January 1952 I protested to the Medical Officer of Health of the Nairobi  	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City Council over the placement of two Country Bus Stops just outside my 
property located on Mathaiga Road near Limuru round-about. The reason for my 
protest with the congregation of large number[s] of natives waiting for buses, the 
noise they made and their habit of leaving refuse and using the adjoining 
properties as a public toilet. This matter is subsequently understood to have been 
discussed between the Traffic Control Committee and the Town Council with a 
view to transferring the bus stop to a point outside the City Council area and 
apparently the only difficulty would be the construction of adequate bays in order 
to keep the buses and their passengers completely off the road. However, no 
action has ever been taken and in view of the State of Emergency and the 
incipient danger presented by these large groups of natives, it would be greatly 
appreciated if you would...[direct] your consideration to this matter.194  
 
What Warden Jr. read as chaos and potentially uncontainable disorder, however, had 
another valance. As we saw in the case of the death of the squatter, and the combination 
of forensic work and narrativizing that followed, points of transit were critical sites where 
information, gossip, and rumours exchanged hands and solidarities were forged. Bus 
stages, in particular, functioned as informal but highly organized sites of exchange. 
Despite the best efforts of the Road Authority, it was nearly impossible to control the 
appropriation of space by unsanctioned businesses along or near roads, their very 
impermanence making them near impossible to police.195  
The Traffic Control Committee visited the site of the Warden Jr., and Vine 
household where the couple added to their list of complaints. As the Town Clerk 
reported:  
 these bus stops in particular encouraged the congregation of undesirable persons,  
hawkers etc...They want the Country Bus Stops near their houses should be 
removed to some remote places as they feel that the congregation of Africans 
mostly Kikuyus is dangerous in these days, when during the day there are no main 
members of their houses and ladies are left alone. They also complained about the 
hawkers entering their premises.196 
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Beyond the obvious utility of claiming Kikuyu were to blame for the disturbances, other 
points worthy of note emerged in this exchange. Hawkers, from the perspective of some, 
were idlers, people without industry, illegitimately using spaces not sanctioned for trade 
or business. From the perspective of the hawkers themselves, however, as well as the 
their customers, these people were entrepreneurs, carving out spaces wherein they 
secured livelihoods through trade while providing essential services and goods to their 
clients. To accept their designation as “hawkers,” then, is to miss the complicated 
“maneuvering” of “relations between social spaces…symbolic resources, [and] concrete 
objects” that were being marshaled within this “informal” sites of commerce.197 The 
nature of hawkers’ businesses, moreover, was premised on a measure of mobility, a set of 
labour practices contingent on unfixing bodies, creating tributaries in the measured flow 
of labour the colonial state had tried to secure.198 As the commissioner of police averred, 
their position in spaces partially beyond the reach of the colonial state: “constituted 
threats to security in the heart of the city.”199  
The location of these sites of partial autonomy, partial exteriority, is significant as 
well. These homes were located on Muthaiga road. A road that, along with Forest Road, 
marked the line dividing the wealthy population of urban settlers from the growing 
African urban settlements. On the one side were the neighbourhoods of Muthaiga and 
Parklands, and on the other side were the technically informal, but even then well 
established, settlements of Mathare, and Eastleigh, locations which were, and remain, 
among the poorest in the country. These men and women, evidently, were not limiting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 AbdouMaliq Simone, For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities, 
(Durham and London: Duke University press, 2004), 105.  
198 White, Comforts, 188.  
199 KNA - DC/NKU/5/2 
	   90	  
their occupation of urban space to those appropriate to kipande people. They had strayed 
off River Road and were forcefully making their presence felt in neighbourhoods 
reserved for white settlement. The state and settlers, importantly, were not alone in 
denigrating these men and women. These mobile entrepreneurs were the resented “time 
bandits” critiqued by the “ethnic patriots” of Central Province.200 
 If people undermined the authority of the KBS by transforming its stages into 
sites of commerce and communication, KBS’ monopoly over the transportation sector 
was also vulnerable to seizure. In 1953, the manager of KBS Ltd. reported a precipitous 
drop in the number of passengers using its services. Between September 23 and 
September 24 the number of passengers dropped by 30 per cent. The alleged boycott, the 
manager claimed, was the result of one of the company’s “Kikuyu Bus Conductors” 
telling “a prospective passenger that he was not allowed to travel in the bus.” Since the 
incident, the manager reported: “Some Africans on bicycles have been observed standing 
at the bus stops and glaring at the odd African passenger in the bus…All the buses to the 
native locations have now been withdrawn.”  
As this story unfolded, the lines of the narrative as set out by the manager became 
decidedly more confused. “The boycott,” the manager wrote, “is Kikuyu inspired because 
all actions taken by Government are thought to be aimed at depricing the Kikuyu of his 
living and increasing the revenue of the European. They think the Bus Company belongs 
to the Municipality.”201 Unwittingly, here the manager hit the nail on the head. As we 
have seen, the contradictions of colonial capitalism in the Kenya colony were manifest in 
the complicated struggle among the demands of settlers, the demands of Africans, and the 	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needs of the colonial state to maintain at least a measure of popular legitimacy.202 What 
the manager located as a misrecognition i.e. KBS was a private rather than public 
amenity was, on another reading, an astute and defiant engagement with these 
contradictions. Thus, while there is no reason to doubt that an African passenger was 
refused the right to board a KBS bus, a more interesting and complicated topography of 
power, as it mapped onto the politics of mobility, perhaps underwrote this story.  
 As we have seen, by the 1920s entrepreneurs living in the Central Province had 
carved out a niche for themselves in the transportation sector. By the 1950s, these 
informal transportation networks seem to have been standardized, with African owned 
lorries plying charted routes. It is against this longer history that the boycott must be 
interpreted. In the early days of the boycott, the manager of KBS wrote to the Town 
Clerk, stating:  
We would like to bring to your notice that many buses other than our own are 
now asking up and setting down the same passengers within the municipal area. 
We do this officially since such acts are in breach of the Exclusive Agreement 
between us, and we ask that immediate steps we taken to prevent such 
infringements.203 
 
Despite the Town Clerk’s efforts to monitor these unsanctioned transportation networks, 
African owned vehicles ably evaded the state’s security apparatus, which picked up only 
“two contraventions of the Council’s By-laws” over the course of fourteen days.204 Part 
of the problem was one of visibility. While police officers trained their attention on 
unsanctioned Public Service Vehicles (P.S.V.s) plying KBS routes, the bulk of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination, (London: 
James Currey, 1990). 
203 KNA - RN/1/79 
204 KNA - RN/1/79 
	   92	  
vehicles in circulation were not passenger vehicles but repurposed lorries.205 These ghost 
vehicles were likely komerera buses, a Kikuyu word that translates to “lie low,” and a 
catchphrase that and characterized the response of many KEM populations in the face of 
emergency regulations. Denied their limited paths to market, these secret buses continued 
to transport traders and to and from Nairobi during the Emergency.206 By discouraging 
Africans from using the services provided by KBS, then, boycotters worked to wrest the 
monopoly over urban transport from the hands of KBS, and it was quite effective. By 
February 26, 1954, the KBS reported that the number of passengers using its services had 
dropped from 3,000/day to a mere 200-300.207 
The conflict between the KBS and a group that would later be known as matatu 
owners was not resolved but, in fact, escalated in the succeeding years. In 1954, the year 
of Operation Anvil, the KBS reported that a number of their conductors were attacked 
and robbed by “gangs of Maragoli,” “armed thugs” who targeted immobile buses idling 
at transport terminuses across the city.208 The KBS noted that these robberies marked the 
resumption of a pattern quite common in the pre-boycott days. Concurrent to these 
attacks, administrators reported the emergence of a transport service going by the 
nomenclature of “Kikuyu Bus Service.” The parallel in the acronyms of the two services 
should not be ignored here.  In a pattern that persists into the present, forms of naming 
and the personification of technologies of mobility, reveals deep-seated antagonisms; 
popular naming a kind of vernacular politics.209 This naming was a form of appropriation 
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that imaginatively and aspirationally imbued the Kikuyu Bus Service with the power and 
capital the KBS’ erstwhile monopoly secured. As in the case of literacy, the appropriation 
of technologies of mobility, once the markers of British prestige, was a means of 
capturing and subverting “the social value of the colonizers.”210 These technologies were 
not, evidently, neutral objects but objects: “appropriated and harnessed to quite a 
different political project.”211  
The Transport Licensing Board struggled to protect KBS’ monopoly over urban 
transport by limiting the scope of the informal transportation sector to “persons who 
either boarded or intend to travel to places where there are no bus services.” These 
provisions, it was hoped, would guarantee that a given “vehicle will not be used in 
competition with established transporters.” Despite the limitations placed on the use of 
transport technologies, the KBS’ 1956 Report of Directors complained: “loopholes in the 
present Transport Licensing…allow wasteful competition, and fare undercutting…[is] a 
daily occurance” (sic).212 The contravention of KBS’ monopoly was difficult to police, as 
drivers altered routes sanctioned by the government on the officially issued passes 
operators were forced to carry. Overlaying the official routes of transport, then, was a 
clandestine topography of movement, routes plied by technologies repurposed to serve 
the needs of the African majority.213  
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In an attempt to thwart the nascent “informal” transport system the government 
worked to centralize and regulate the colony’s transportation system.214 It seems 
administrators had learned that people were repurposing war lorries for the transportation 
of people, and created a body responsible for determining the relative road-worthiness of 
“all new omnibuses and vehicles converted and intended to be used as omnibuses.”215 
This, it seems, did not quell the problem, and competition reached such a pitch that by 
1959 the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast Province was referring to it as a 
“transport war.”216 
 In the face of this “transport war,” the Town Clerk devised a novel solution. 
Technologies of mobility serving the public would be segregated, the KBS managing the 
transport of white populations, and hiring white drivers while other systems of transport 
would have: “drivers and conductors of other races…[and would be] responsible for 
omnibuses reserved exclusively for the use of other races.”217 Race would determine how 
and in what vehicles people were permitted to travel. Technologies of mobility, like 
physical movement itself, would reflect the structure of the colonial hierarchy.  
Competition and the possibility for capital accumulation, it seems, would be 
allowed but it would reflect the highly stratified social organization of the Kenya colony. 
As one Provincial Commissioner put it, operators seemed to be doing: “very nicely and a 
little healthy competition would help the public do a little better; and what are the roads 
for? Transport means trade and trade means wealth. Indeed, one could argue that mobility 
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is the very essence of prosperity.”218  The Provincial Commissioner could not have better 
captured the arguments being advanced by those variously working in the mobility 
industry. Attempts to divert social value thus, on one level, succeeded.  
Movement was, for many, the means by which respectable adulthood was 
realized, particularly in a context where other avenues to social respectability and self-
mastery had been effectively blocked. The emergence of KBS’ double in the form of the 
Kikuyu Bus Service was a claim for parity and equality, a parallelism designed to make 
the services provided by the original KBS obsolete. These efforts were thwarted and 
asymmetry was reinscribed through the segregation of transport. In microcosm, then, the 
debates over transportation, mobility, and segregation, mirrored the larger and 
multivalent debates animating politics in Kenya colony in the postwar period. Rather than 
weakening the symbolic load of technologies of mobility, the experiences of this period 
further strengthened the associations among vehicle type, mode of travel, and race; a 
situation which persists in the present, class replacing race as the ultimate determinant.  
 If in town technologies of mobility formed a pivot around which myriad concerns 
swirled, the issue of roads in “African areas” was fomenting another set of debates in the 
1950s. Mau Mau had raised critical questions regarding “development” in the colony. 
While presented by many, most notably the British press, as an atavistic throwback, 
others asked whether blame was better located at the feet of colonial development 
policies. As one administrator wrote in a document titled: “Report on the Road System in 
African Areas:” “Recent events appear to have given ample evidence of the folly of 
allowing communications to lag behind development.” Development if unmonitored, 
Mau Mau powerfully demonstrated, could spin out of control. On one interpretation, 	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then, Mau Mau evidenced the possibility that the straight lines of development, the very 
modus operandi justifying colonial occupation, could go awry.  
Here was the paradox of indirect rule and development policies in the Kenya colony. 
Over the course of the colonial period, development, as it was mediated through 
technologies of mobility, was transformed into a powerful discourse, over which 
administrators did not agree and, more importantly, over which they could not retain a 
monopoly. Brian Larkin, writing of colonial technologies in the Nigerian context, argues 
that this tension reflects the “colonial sublime,” which encompassed “two distinct modes 
of colonial rule.” One based on “difference and the sharp separation between colonizer 
and colonized.” The other proffering “technology as a mode of development.”219 Through 
this process, he argues, the sublime is domesticated and destroyed, technologies 
transformed into banal objects. Destruction through domestication is certainly part of the 
process, but domestication is also contingent on technologies being integrated into, and 
shaped by, existing cultural logics. While the development concept, as it was related to 
technologies of mobility, had been beset by contradictions from the outset, once set in 
motion, Africans appropriated one envisioning of development – the right to inclusion 
through “modernization” – and overlay it with an older, and more enduring moral 
economy – the right to self-mastery and social adulthood.  As people tethered together 
these two teleological registers, development appeared to administrators as a “problem” 
to be managed. Like the roads themselves, development, a telos-driven reading of human 
“progress,” required careful tending and watchful monitoring.  
These contradictions formed only one of the complicated strands shaping popular 
perceptions in the post-war period. In order to flesh out the vexed place of roads as stand-	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ins for modernity and development for black Kenyans, it is critical to address their 
materiality. That is, how these infrastructures were brought into being. As we have seen, 
colonial development projects rested on a reading of Africans as subjects, a framework 
wherein Africans materially bore the brunt of the colony’s infrastructural expansion. As 
late as the mid-1950s, district administrators were bemoaning the fact that they were 
being denied their historic right to compel people to maintain district roads.220  Without 
the right to compulsion, so the story went, roads were falling into disrepair. For 
marginalized Kenyans, in other words, infrastructures of mobility were more routinely 
experienced as sites of stasis, as evidence of their status as subjects. This experience was 
reaffirmed during the emergency period as compulsory labour was revived in reserves 
and internment camps.221  
The technopolitical strategies of the colonial state, as this period demonstrated, were 
incredibly flexible when development bled into its important other, “unrest.” This created 
a paradox wherein development was positioned as both the cause of, and solution to, 
unrest. Expertise gone awry required a greater measure of expertise; technological 
problems had technological solutions. As John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman note:  
this preoccupation with using ‘development’ programmes as a means of halting social 
disintegration reached its greatest intensity with regard to the Kikuyu. The central 
thrust of administrative politics in the three Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Fort Hall and 
Nyeri became reactionary in the most literal sense; it was intended to reverse existing 
processes of change the provincial administration regarded as destructive.222 
 
Development, once evidence of, and reward for, “native” progress became in this period 
the punishment for subversion and a solution to “backsliding.” As the DC of West Suk 
opined:  	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It was no surprise to find West Suk at the bottom of the priority list [for development 
projects], but I view with considerable dismay the thought that not a single shilling is 
likely to come to the district for new road development or improvement of existing 
roads for at least as far ahead as the report looks, five years. This district…is ill 
served for roads, and would not have had the tracks it has, had it not been for the 
outbreak of D.Y.M. several years ago. Judging by the road development now going 
on in the Kikuyu districts, it would almost seem that crime pays! I hope that it will 
not need further lawlessness here before money is forthcoming to extend the road 
system.223 
 
Half threatening, half humorous, the DC hit the proverbial nail on the head. Rural road 
development, for so long demanded by Kenyans living in the countryside as a means of 
creating the material points of entry into markets was finally, on the heels of an 
“atavistic” uprising, being fulfilled. The state’s response to Mau Mau, as was the case in 
late-colonial Dutch East Indies, was an attempt to impose a new angular geometry in a 
bid to shore up authority as: “reality grew messier and harder to make into a straight 
line.”224  
These contradictions were not lost on the Embu, Meru, and Kikuyu people most 
directly affected by the emergency regulations. Operation Anvil was marked by colonial 
attempts to control the Mau Mau crises through imposing a new and incredibly violent 
administrative grid over the Kenya colony. In 1954, Nairobi was purged of Kikuyu, 
Embu, and Meru populations, followed by the widespread internment of Kikuyu. As for 
the Embu and Meru, new “villages” were designed as containment units that could be 
easily monitored.  
Even in these dire conditions, technologies of mobility remained the idiom of 
choice, a symbol of the evidently faltering promises of colonial rule in the Kenya colony.  
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Reporting on the reception of government publications in an Embu “village,” the 
Beechers noted the acuity of African audiences, who dismissed government periodicals 
for what they were, propaganda. Constraints on people’s mobility formed the core 
counter-evidence Embu cited in dispelling government claims that the counter-
insurgency was a success. As one astute informant reported: “'When everything goes so 
splendidly, why cannot I get a permit for my bycicle.' [sic]”225 As we have seen, the state 
had been concerned about the unmonitored circulation of technologies of mobility and 
people since its beginnings, concerns which reached a new pitch during Mau Mau. And 
monitoring technologies of mobility occupied a central place in the government’s 
emergency regulations, which required Africans in Central Province have: “a written 
permit” from an Administrative Officer to drive buses, lorries, cars, motorcycles. The 
administration did not stop with automotive technologies. There was even a provision for 
bicycles, which likewise could only be used with a written permit.226  
In the past, technologies of mobility were used to shore up the authority of 
colonial officials. By the interwar period they were held out as a reward for faithful 
service.227 More ambiguously from the perspective of the state, however, they had also 
become core symbols of participation in the wage labour economy, the cultivation of 
desire a sure sign of évolué status. For those most affected by Emergency regulations, it 
became clear that the promises of modernity and the materialities that operated as its 
stand in, could easily be revoked. Development was not, evidently, a unilinear process 
but one that zig-zagged and could change directions. Bikes denied were evidence of this 	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schizoid itinerary. Despite state efforts, settlers and government officials continued to 
report on Kikuyu use of lorries for purposes of trade and human transport throughout 
Central Province and the Rift Valley.228 And bikes without lanterns continued to be a 
favorite mode of transport for guerilla fighters moving through the city.229  
Development discourse, and paths to social adulthood, both telos driven 
epistemologies, had become intertwined. As James Smith notes in the context of literacy, 
new technologies and colonial markers of social capital did not eclipse “traditional” 
forms but, rather, were incorporated and remade according to existing cultural logics. 
Literacy, on Smith’s reading, was a skill incorporated into Kikuyu rites of social 
maturation. Most notably, education was imagined by some to be the equivalent of 
warrior training. A similar process of value transfer is evident in the context of 
technologies of mobility.  
The Emergency, as we have seen, radically called into question the telos 
engendered by development discourse but equally uncertain were “traditional” notions of 
individual “development” in pursuit of social reproduction. What, people asked 
themselves, could be stabilized as “value,” in the face of these deeply entangled 
transformations.230 As the cash economy transformed the relationship between labour and 
maturation, livestock as the ultimate and stable unit of value was no longer a certainty. 
As the Beechers noted both everyday transactions and more important exchanges of 
value, such as bridewealth, were increasingly mediated by the cash form. Cattle and land 
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were no longer the foremost objects people invested in, the uncertainty of the Emergency 
rendering people’s futures uncertain.231 The Beechers reported:  
Although many of the inhabitants of our village are firmly convinced that with the 
end of the emergency they will be able to return to their homesteads and graze 
and fatten their goats and cattle again as in the old days, they have at present 
enough difficulties to question the wisdom of accepting goats and cattle, the 
normal currency, as important means of payment, as for instance in the case of the 
brideprice. There is a growing tendency to ask for money also from the non-wage-
earners, which often results in the sale of live-stock. This is in fact a selling of 
capital which can easily find the impression of added riches, while in fact it can 
dangerously impoverish the owner, especially if the money was not well used for 
other than immediate wishes (Bicycles!).232 
 
What the Beechers missed in this assessment were the more deep-seated transformations 
at play. If, in the past, cattle payments were critical to social reproduction and key 
signifiers of maturation, developments in the colonial economy had, for many, blocked 
this conventional path. In a context where cattle were a) increasingly limited in their 
circulation and, b) where possession did not guarantee a transformation in status i.e. 
warrior to adult, the stability of livestock as backer of value was no longer secure. In their 
place emerged technologies of mobility, objects of congealed power, now captured and 
deployed as a means of measuring and articulating individual “development.”233 This was 
not interpreted, as the Beechers interpreted it, as an investment in the “false security” of 
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“'progress', expressed in material goods.”234 In the context of the perceived greed of a 
generation of “elders,” there was no guarantee that promises of redistribution would be 
realized. It was this uncertainty, in conjunction with the prestige value of technologies of 
mobility, which led people to locate the promises of the future in technologies that 
allowed them to transcend time as they traversed space. In transcending the proscriptive 
spatial logic engendered in colonial rule, these narratives thus pointed to a potential 
future where, by contrast to the present, movement – both physical and social - proceeded 
unmolested.  
As people imagined their ideal, post-Emergency futures, they imagined futures 
filled with bikes and cars, both moving along smoothly tarmacked roads, the prospective 
routes of individual maturation. These objects, fetishized by the colonial state, and 
representing in congealed form the power of colonizers, were incorporated into Kenyan 
systems of value, their power captured and rerouted in the aid of social reproduction. 
Kenya’s post-independence leadership, themselves deeply implicated in these processes, 
in turn reified these imagined futures as they initiated, though in a different register, a 
technopolitical regime of their own in the postcolonial period.  
     *** 
While the Emergency had, by 1960, drawn to a close, politics in the Kenya colony 
continued to be shaped by the dialectics of mobility and immobility that had 
characterized the colonial period more generally. And clandestine and unsanctioned 
appropriation of technologies of mobility, repurposed for the movement of humans, 
remained a preoccupation. While Emergency regulations had sanctioned incredibly wide 	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parameters for how police dealt with people on the move, the Emergency’s end required 
that new structures of surveillance be put in place.  
The administration again responded by creating centralized government policy on 
transport. Lorries, now transformed into PSVs were difficult for the administration to 
monitor and “evasion,” the administration noted, had become routine.235 No longer could 
vehicles plying for hire be serviced at private garages236. Rather, government mechanics 
would be responsible for ensuring vehicles were road-worthy. 
The problem was two-fold. On the one hand, the administration continued to be 
concerned with unsanctioned mobility, writ large. On the other, however, these small-
scale but highly organized entrepreneurs were again squeezing the KBS from its position 
of preeminence in the field of transport. The KBS, recalling the blow to their returns in 
the 1950s, worked to secure agreements from private bus owners, who had conceded to 
standardize fares for service. However, many of the drivers had gone rogue. These 
“renegades,” were not charging the agreed upon Shs 33/-, but fares ranging from Shs 25/- 
to 35/-. The fares charged by these pirate buses were not simply contingent on distance 
traveled or baggage transported, but were critically shaped by the identity of the 
passenger and “government servants” were routinely “charged more than civilians.” This 
competition was not localized but spanned from the Coast through Central Province and 
the Rift Valley.237  
The issues that swirled around the politics of mobility during the colonial period 
did not lose their purchase in postcolonial readings of development and modernity. 
Indeed, liberating technologies of mobility from the shackles that restrained African 	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capital accumulation critically shaped the policies of the first post-independence Kenyan 
government. What was different, however, was that men like Jomo Kenyatta were well 
aware of the historically fraught and politically potent issues that congealed in and 
around discussions and contestations over technologies of mobility. It was from this 
insider vantage point that the politics of mobility received a new lease on life in the 
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Following the British withdrawal in 1963, colonial restrictions on urban migration were 
lifted, leading thousands of rural Kenyans to travel to Nairobi with hopes of attaining the 
material wealth associated with the promises of postcolonial urbanity and “modern” 
forms of capital accumulation.238 The status of roads as both symbolic and physical 
conduits, providing the routes by which people escaped rural poverty and representing 
the possibility of accumulating urban wealth, gained renewed strength in this period. As 
James Howard Smith notes, roads were “the means by which people became respectable 
citizens by liberating themselves from the limitations of the rural…[through] accessing 
the city.”239 It was out of this longer history that roads emerged as a central metaphor, 
and a material necessity, in discourses of “development” and “modernity” in the 
postcolonial period. If roads acted as the conduits between city and country, under 
Kenyatta’s watch the matatu became the central symbol of that mobility, linking rural 
regions to urban centres, and in the process implicating itself in the promises of post-
independence prosperity. 
These connections were reinforced in 1972 when Kenyatta issued a motor 
licensing decree that deregulated the industry. Kenyatta argued that the matatu (privately 
owned minibus) industry was emblematic of the type of capitalist entrepreneurship that 
would enable the postcolonial Kenyan state to achieve “modernity” through capitalist 
“development.”240 He argued, moreover, that the free and unencumbered movement of 
the population was an essential precondition for individual and national prosperity.241 
This argument had resonance in Kenya where, as we have seen, memories of British 	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colonialism were inextricably linked to a colonial praxis that had at its core the 
circumscription of “native” mobility, both as a strategy of surveillance and as a means of 
securing labour.242 Indeed, according to popular memory, supported by the documentary 
record, the matatu industry was started during the colonial period as a strategy to evade 
the ever-tightening strictures of colonial surveillance.243 By deregulating the industry in 
the postcolonial context, Kenyatta was drawing on a historically resonant cultural logic 
that linked independence to mobility, implicating the industry in both the project of 
development and the potential for personal, capitalist enrichment. It was, moreover, part 
and parcel of the process of Africanization that guided much of the policy-making in the 
early postcolonial period.244 If road-systems and the matatu industry were positioned as 
vehicles through which to attain the material prosperity of the soon-to-be-realized future 
in the promising early years of independence, in the context of the perceived failures of 
those promises they remained at the heart of vernacular discourses of development.  
     *** 
On December 3, 1991, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi conceded to the 
demands of foreign donors, and grudgingly proclaimed the initiation of multi-party 
politics. The following day he addressed the nation. Placing the relative development 
achieved under his rule at the heart of his speech, he proclaimed: “We have achieved our 
national goals of development due to peace that has prevailed on our land. There has been 
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considerable development in all areas of human endeavor…But we are not finished yet. 
A lot remains to be done.”245 In an attempt to shore up public support in the context of 
the instatement of a multi-party political system and faltering economy, Moi mobilized 
the rhetoric of development in a form that was recognizable to the citizenry.246  
Embedded in this statement was a set of interrelated themes that had become 
common rhetoric over the course of the colonial period. Citizens had to remain loyal to 
“elders,” and wait patiently for “development” – collective and individual, material and 
symbolic – to materialize. Under Moi, however, a troubling patina overlay this narrative. 
The issues that swirled around Mau Mau had never really been resolved. Kikuyu 
communities remained deeply divided and concerns over legitimate authority continued 
to plague the public sphere.247 Moreover, under the leadership of Kenyatta, many of 
Kenya’s non-Kikuyu publics felt themselves to have been unfairly marginalized to the 
advantage of Kikuyu neighbors.248  
Moi thus drew on an ideology which held that strongmanship was the only means 
by which descent into “tribal” chaos could be avoided and peace and prosperity secured. 
For the majority of Kenyans, all of these sentiments had lost any real purchase, simply 
representing another instance of the cynical politicization of the discourse of 
development, a materially rooted process increasingly detached from the practices of the 
state.  
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It was a particularly difficult line to maintain in the context of the 1980s, a decade 
of palpable economic decline, during which the county’s infrastructure and social 
services deteriorated, and unemployment reached unprecedented levels. In popular 
discourse, many of these processes were linked to state corruption, which had contributed 
to forcing the rate of inflation from 19.6 per cent to 27.5 per cent in the year leading up to 
the transition; representing the highest rates since independence.249 As the economic 
crisis worsened, civil liberties and rights of association were circumscribed. Within this 
context, Moi’s proclamation that Kenya’s project of development was nearly complete 
was untenable, at best reflecting the hopeful promises of the early years of independence, 
and at worst representing an inversion of many Kenyans’ experiences of the 1980s. This 
is not to say, however, that the discourse of development lost traction in the popular 
imagination; to the contrary, during the period discussions of development proliferated.250  
    *** 
This chapter focuses on the various routes Kenyans pursued in articulating their 
discontent with the corruption of the Moi state during the 1992 transition to multi-party 
politics, using the lens of discussions of roads and the matatu industry. This section sheds 
light on the various modes of Kenyan political engagement in the context of a repressive 
state apparatus, and points to the highly contested political terrain that emerged in the 
period, as definitions of what constituted “legitimate” political engagement were again 
negotiated. As the sheer proliferation of these narratives in the print media suggests, 
repressive state practices initiated under the Kenya African National Unity (KANU) 
government and strengthened under Moi, which tried to silence public dissent through 	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circumscribing the parameters of civil society, led to the creation of alternative spaces of 
political engagement located outside the reach of the coercive state. In forging these 
spaces Kenyans of various stripes drew on discursive strategies and a set of metaphors 
that found their origins in the early colonial period.  
A cursory analysis of the politics of mobility in this period suggests three 
alternative sites of covert politics that functioned as distinct narrative genres. The first 
addressed the condition of roads proper, the second criticized the “dysfunctional” matatu 
industry, and the third recounted the explicit politics of matatu industry workers. Reading 
these narratives in tandem reveals implicit expressions of discontent with the functioning 
of the state. Indeed, when these transport narratives, mainly composed of banal 
discussions of everyday social engagements, are read against the broader socio-economic 
and political backdrop, seemingly apolitical statements assume concrete political 
meanings. Apparently benign discussions of road maintenance and mortality in traffic 
accidents emerge as points of entry into virulent critiques of state corruption as it was 
associated with the failures of infrastructural development. As this typology suggests, the 
informal sites of civil engagement embodied in transport narratives, spoke to an emergent 
politics that was firmly rooted in everyday material realities; exposing the discrete 
politics expressed through them as critiques originating in expressly materialist 
grievances.251 As such, roads and matatus functioned both as symbolic sites where 
discontents with the functioning of the state and its corrupt practices were registered, and 
as material evidence of those failures. When these narratives are read against one another, 
however, a much more complicated and contested political terrain becomes visible; one 
that was marked by a specifically masculine brand of youthful politics that centered 	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around matatu culture and the anxieties surrounding its potential. Through this analysis it 
will become evident that two interrelated political discourses were at work: one that 
criticized the practices of the state through the expression of everyday discontents; and a 
second, which articulated highly contested, generationally specific, yet historically 
resonant, (re)vision of social maturity, and political belonging. 
    *** 
In order to contextualize these narratives they must be read against the backdrop 
of the feedback between structural adjustment programs initiated under the global regime 
of neo-liberalism and Kenyan political reforms. The transition to multi-party politics 
arrived on the coattails of a Western donors’ meeting held in Paris in 1991, where it was 
decided that $328 million in fast distributing aid would be suspended pending the Moi 
government’s liberalization of the country’s economic and political structures.252 This 
measure was an extreme about-face, Kenya having been held up by the “international 
community” as a model for postcolonial African development. Indeed, foreign donors 
had poured millions of dollars into Kenya to encourage capitalist expansion, viewing the 
country as an important bulwark against the perceived threat of socialist Tanzania. For 
much of the Kenyan population, however, the World Bank’s sudden concern that 
corruption was impeding capitalist development was viewed with marked cynicism.  
The majority of Kenyans, excluded from the spoils of corruption, were well aware 
that patrons at all levels of the political order had consumed funds intended for 
development; they experienced it as an everyday reality. The perceived failures of the 
country’s development were so pervasive in everyday discourse that they permeated 
Kenyans’ lexical worlds, refashioning government rhetoric in telling ways. Particularly 	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salient to our discussion, the term maendeleo or development came to signify self-
interested, rather than publicly interested, forms of accumulation.253 The students of Jomo 
Kenyatta University spoke directly to this inversion in September 1992 when they 
boycotted national development courses, claiming their content constituted nothing more 
than political deceptions.254 This evacuation and subsequent inversion of meaning was 
critically shaped by the experiences of the Moi era but built on important colonial 
foundations.255 As David Cohen and Atieno Odihambo write, on the eve of independence 
Kenya inherited a legacy of development initiatives that hinged on the idiosyncrasies of 
individual administrators who often exaggerated potential costs and oversold prospective 
benefits. This history was one beset by failure, derailment, mismanagement, and the 
vagaries of personality. As they write: “It was this development apparatus of ‘tentacular 
technicians’ and ‘district plans about plans’ that Kenya inherited at independence. The 
rhetoric, framework, and principles outlasted the formal end of empire.”256 Against this 
longer history, the Moi government’s claim that single party politics were the only route 
to maendeleo (conventionally defined) appeared farcical.257 These contextual settings 
serve as a partial framework for understanding transportation narratives as national 
narratives with deep historical roots, and which emerged at the intersection of global 
shifts and the localized frameworks through which they gained their meaning.  
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In order to ascertain the politics at work in the mundane, it is critical that we 
situate everyday practices and perceptions at the centre of analysis. If, as Achille 
Mbembe suggests, politics in the postcolony are typified by their routine banality what 
makes these everyday practices surrounding transportation an interesting point of entry 
into Kenyan political culture during the transition is the very fact of their proliferation.258 
Things that are common occurrences, taken to communicate nothing beyond their initial 
meaning, lose even that value in their repetition and as such fall out of favor in popular 
discourse. If, however, their meaning extends beyond themselves, if they act as signposts 
within broader socio-symbolic worlds, their power is magnified in and through their 
repetition. It is the fact that Kenyans never tire of discussing the number of road accidents 
and the state of the country’s road system that makes them an essential part of broader 
social and political discourses.  
    *** 
As in the colonial period, it is the layered hierarchies embedded in structures of 
patronage by and large sustain postcolonial Kenyan political culture. These structures 
also function as central conduits through which citizens make claims and register 
discontents; providing an essential series of networks that link the majority of those 
relatively excluded from power and prestige to powerful political and economic 
personalities. The politics of patronage thus forge a series of linkages, connecting the 
highest office of the president to the district officer to the citizenry, forming the basis of a 
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“moral economy” within which power held by patrons theoretically translates into 
material benefits and symbolic prestige for clients.259  
Critiques of the state of roads, then, function as claims making devices, rendering 
ineffective political patrons illegitimate and calling them to account for their failure to 
uphold the principles of the system of reciprocity. Emblematic of this use of 
transportation narratives was an article published in the Daily Nation on November 12, 
1992, tellingly titled “Political acrobat send [sic] a chill into the enemy,”260 which is 
worth quoting at length.  
[Siaya] must rank as the constituency that has produced one of the best known 
political acrobats. Siaya District headquarters with its dusty roads and unlit streets 
is located in Alego/Usonga…the town has no sewage system, no storm drains, 
virtually no tangible infrastructure…That is the constituency…that Mr. Aringo 
wants to reclaim…others of his stature at the time used their clout to build 
schools, health centres, roads and other landmarks that would serve as their 
memory later in life…As a resident of Siaya town, he was expected to use his 
influence to lobby for the tarmacking [sic] of the town’s streets. More important, 
he was in a position to influence the extension of the tarmac to Nyadora to 
facilitate the transportation of fish and other goods from the hinterland. But he 
was content with the flag.  
 
As this rich passage suggests, Aringo withdrew his right to a position in politics by 
failing to meet the expectations of him as the district’s patron. This failure was articulated 
as having inverted the logic of the moral economy embodied in patron-client 
relationships. This symbolic misappropriation of prestige was directly linked to the 
material consequences of the inversion. It was positioned as having impeded the 	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development of the region through failing to extend infrastructural linkages in the form of 
an efficient road-network. Through calling their patron to account for his failures in a 
national daily, this constituency mobilized the familiar language of the politics of 
responsibility between patron and client.  
One of the critical discontents being registered through these narratives, then, was 
the perceived asymmetry in the investments of patrons and clients, between wananchi 
(citizens) and the state, which complicated and undermined the ostensible relationship 
between patrons as informal organs of the state and their purported function. However, a 
more complicated political terrain becomes evident if one looks to the geographic details 
and rhetorical structure of the narrative.  
What made Aringo’s behaviour so egregious was linked to his status as a resident 
of the region. However, the professed discontent was not simply a result of the diversion 
of public monies into private hands, but pointed to perceived “ethnoregional patters of 
stratification.” 261 The Siaya District, located outside of Kisumu in Kenya’s Western 
Province, is home to a predominantly Luo population who popularly perceive themselves 
to have been systematically excluded from Kenyan politics since independence, a 
sentiment that was compounded following Moi’s rise to power.262 Ultimately, then, the 
critique extended beyond the patron proper and suggested the failure of the patronage 
system as a whole. In other words, the critique circuitously addressed the perception of 
broader, specifically ethnic, inequities that characterize the Kenyan politico-cultural 
terrain. If the routes of patronage had been blocked by ethnic favoritism, the diversion of 
monies intended to forge the routes of development were its perceived consequence. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Andrew Apter, The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 2005), 37.  
262 Cohen and Odhiambo, The Risks of Knowledge, 6.   
	   115	  
While conforming to the state line of a de-ethnicized political culture – articulating 
discontent in the language of region – this narrative nevertheless expressed the popular 
understanding that ethnically determined exclusions from the political realm translated 
into material exclusions in the economic realm.  
As noted by Mikael Karlstrom, the legibility of indirect messages communicated 
between different strata of society depends on shared understandings of the functioning 
of their sociopolitical worlds. On this reading, banal critiques of development 
instrumentalized: “a local discourse of social morality and political accountability that 
[theoretically provided]…critical leverage against…rulers.”263 This was a particularly 
effective communicative strategy in Kenya, where regional affiliation is popularly held to 
be synonymous with ethnic identification; indeed, where regional and ethnic exclusions 
are perceived to constitute two sides of the same coin.264  
Attacks targeting ethnic clientelism were particularly pronounced in transport 
narratives directed at powerful bureaucrats by regional politicians demanding 
accountability for the expropriation of funds intended for regional development. In part, 
this narrative flexibility can be accounted for through looking to a broader series of 
transitions taking place in Kenyan political culture during the period. As the economy 
faltered, the overlap between the category of the political and the bureaucratic grew 
increasingly pronounced. Public, bureaucratic offices were held to the same standards of 
accountability as a politician was to its constituency.265 Concurrently, forms of illicit 
accumulation, which had become central to the functioning of the patronage system when 	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the state was flush with foreign currency, had palpable material effects in the context of 
the faltering economy; transforming illicit but accepted forms of accumulation into 
unsanctioned wealth.266  
The indistinct zone between political and bureaucratic functioning, sanctioned and 
unsanctioned forms of accumulation, clearly emerges in the following narrative. On May 
14, 1992, The Standard published an article titled “Mibei cornered over road,” which 
recounted the failures of various levels in the patronage pyramid.  
The Minister for Public Works…was yesterday put to task by Members over the 
repair of a tarmack [sic] road…The deputy Speaker of the National 
Assembly…who is MP for Kitui North [which is located in a region popularly 
referred to as Kamba Land], informed the Minister that Shs 4 million had been 
allocated to the repair work on the road and urged him to visit the road in order to 
determine ‘which route the money took.’267  
 
This narrative not only suggested that ethno-regional marginalization was a central 
feature of postcolonial Kenyan governance, but pointed to the means by which it was 
secured; in particular through the strategic circulation of wealth, specifically as it was 
instantiated in development projects. By encouraging the Minister to go “see” the road, 
this passage suggested the palpable, indeed visible, impact of ethnic clientelism on 
regional development.  
Indeed, the increasingly tenuous link between capital investment and material 
return was a central preoccupation expressed through these narratives. On July 20 The 
Standard ran a piece titled “City Hall should repair roads now, ” which suggested citizens 
had become the victims of coerced but officially sanctioned robbery at the behest of the 
state. The journalist wrote: “The state of roads in Nairobi is pathetic to say the least. The 	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City Commission collects millions of shillings in [the] form of [a] service charge from 
the residents yet services in the City continue to deteriorate.”268 As with the other 
narratives explored, what was at issue here was the inequity of the exchange between the 
people and the state. Public forms of taxation, ostensibly collected to promote a “national 
good,” were viewed as having no tangible function. Real money in wananchi terms 
became ephemeral when handed over to representatives of the public service sector.269 
By registering these critiques, Kenyans pointed to the concrete ways in which the 
corruption of the Moi regime had “hastened the process through which the sign of 
development was unleashed from its referents and came to appear simulacral.”270 
Standard journalist, Raphel Kahaso, made this point explicit in an article titled 
“Roads maintenance vital.” Kahaso’s rhetorical style signaled the root of the grievance 
pointedly. “The inability of the City Commission to maintain…[the roads] has led to 
them becoming potholed. This is despite the levying of unpopular tax called service 
charge.”271 Responsible bodies, unable or unwilling to fulfill their ostensible role, had 
tricked Kenyans into lining the pockets of civil servants who misrepresented a generic 
“tax” as a “service charge;” a category of fiscal exchange which suggested a connection 
between compulsory payment and palpable material improvement. As the patron-client 
system faltered under the conditions of neo-liberal reforms, demands put to wananchi for 
capital by state officials cum patrons appeared unequal to the symbolic and material 
benefits received.272 Speaking to the Kenyan context, Michael Lamont has referred to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 “City Hall should repair roads now,” The Standard, July 20, 1992., 8. 
269 It is worth noting that during this period there were numerous stories circulating about the 
proliferation of fake currency in the Kenyan economy.  
270 Smith, Bewitching Development, 34.  
271 Raphel Kahaso, “Roads maintenance vital,” The Standard, February 20, 1992., 18-19. 
272 Blunt, “Satan as Imitator,” 315. 
	   118	  
process as the “personalization of infrastructural power.”273 It was not, then, the fact of 
corruption per se that was the predominant preoccupation, but the existence of legal 
structures that coerced wananchi to contribute to corruption without receiving any of the 
expected dividends. In a manner similar to what Janet Roitman describes in her 
discussion of the constitution of the fiscal subject in Cameroon, this representation of the 
fiscal relationship between citizens and the Kenyan state questioned the “the logical bases 
for fiscal interventions, and the very concept of wealth as a public versus private 
good.”274 
Importantly, these narratives were but one strand in a broader narrative genre 
recounting everyday expropriations of wananchi achieved through the falsification of 
identities.275 In particular, stories recounting robberies committed by men dressed as 
police officers proliferate in the Kenyan press during the Moi years.276 What is interesting 
about these narratives within this broader context is the slippage between the category of 
criminal and official, between sanctioned and unsanctioned forms of expropriation.277 
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Criminals dressed as police officers in order to fleece unsuspecting “victims,” while 
police officers were routinely accused of demanding money for invented legal 
infractions.278 In popular discourse these acts served the same function, which was the 
victimization of the highly flexible, but rhetorically powerful, category of wananchi. 
As these multiple functions suggest, it was the flexibility of transport narratives 
that made them ideal claims making devices; allowing the population to approach not 
simply the perceived failures of patrons in fomenting development but the legitimacy of 
the political system as a whole. Keeping in sight the material, political, and physical 
dangers of criticizing Moi directly during this period and the vertical structure of 
patronage networks, critiques of the practices of the Minister for Public Works spoke not 
only to the corruption of the bureaucratic structure, but lent themselves to critiques of the 
president himself and the type of politics with which he was popularly associated.  
Through articulating discontent with state corruption in the language of 
infrastructural degradation, and filtering it through a high level public servant, the 
potency of critiques advanced at the highest levels of political power was tempered. 
However, as Donald Brenneis suggests in his explanation of indirection in 
communicative action, there are always multiple intended audiences, for each of whom a 
statement contains a specifically targeted meaning. Comments: “ostensibly addressed to 	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one party…[communicate messages beyond the primary audience to] one’s primary 
target, the ‘overhearer,’[who] is also present.”279 Indeed, the consistency with which Moi 
attempted to shore up public support through mobilizing the discourse of development 
suggests that he read these covert expressions of discontent as bold statements that 
powerfully called into question his legitimacy.  
      *** 
 These everyday discussions of roads and transportation entered into dialogue with 
and expressed broader discourses of discontent that approached the corruption of the state 
and the relative development that was its perceived consequence. If we situate these 
narratives as more and less subtle politics for change, focused specifically on the failures 
of maendeleo, the politics inhered in the practices of matatu industry workers emerge as 
their explicit counterpart. During the period leading up to the election, matatu industry 
workers staged strikes protesting police corruption, demanded to know where funds 
intended for road repairs had been siphoned to, and called repeatedly for the release of 
political prisoners.280 In other words, this body explicitly expressed its discontents along 
many of the same registers as wananchi did in and through transportation narratives. 
Their critiques and demands pointed to the state’s failure to protect the rights of its 
citizens, the increasingly tenuous link between state organs and their purported function, 
and the problems of everyday corruption. How then do we account for the simultaneity 
with which expressions of allegiance and contempt toward the matatu industry were 
articulated in statements such as the following: “Oh yes, I hate and fear matatus all right. 	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But I won’t live without them: I refuse to live in a Nairobi without matatus?”281 I think 
the way to approach this ambivalence is to see it as the expression of a unity premised on 
alienation from the spoils of state corruption, which was bisected along generational lines 
in the context of the re-politicization of the category of youth.   
As has been suggested, the matatu industry occupied a central location in the 
Kenyan popular imagination as a symbol of the prospects of both national and individual 
prosperity. As such, matatus were not simply a material necessity, transporting wananchi 
to and from work, but were co-opted into the Kenyan imagination as an everyday marker 
of status. At the individual level, then, the matatu both pointed to the possibilities of the 
future, and were emblematic markers of the present. As Angelique Haugerud argues, 
mode of transport in Kenya exposes one’s position on the socio-economic hierarchy and 
thus one’s relative proximity to power. Within this symbolic terrain the Mercedes Benz 
signifies those at the top of the hierarchy, while the matatu signifies everyday 
wananchi.282 Similarly, discussing the South African context, the Comaroffs observe that 
the BMW has become an object of desire because it is symbolic of the material goods 
that apartheid denied.283 These analyses bolster the claims of the present thesis, which has 
argued that markers of status have become embodied in technologies of mobility in 
Kenya, powerfully pointing to the differences between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” 
In popular discourse, these objects operate simultaneously as symbols of desire and 
resentment, concurrently evoking praise and criticism.284 As such, the meanings 
communicated through discussions that involve these commodity forms extend beyond 	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the materiality of the forms themselves, gesturing toward broader discourses of social 
inequity.  
Within the context of transport narratives, these symbolic politics were 
reproduced in everyday engagements.285 Within the confines of the matatu, wealth 
became the object of critique through routine interactions with its material symbols - 
BMWs and Mercedes Benzs - a process through which socio-economic inequalities were 
popularly addressed.286 Traveling by matatu flattened difference by emphasizing socio-
economic likeness. As one rider presciently put it: “unless you go about town in a 
chauffeur-driven Benz, you must deal with…[matatus] every day.”287 While this sense of 
socio-economic solidarity based on exclusion featured in the complicated relationship 
between wananchi and the matatu industry during the Moi era, the transformation of 
youth into a political category substantially problematized an alliance rooted in shared 
experiences of material alienation.  
In order to situate the politics of matatu industry workers, it is necessary to 
address some of the political maneuverings of the period, as they led to the formation of 
new, particularly youthful political subjectivities. As has been noted, throughout Moi’s 
tenure, the discourse of development became increasingly detached from the practices of 
the state. Moi and his inner circle were viewed by much of the Kenyan population not as 
the purveyors of development, but as its antithesis. The style of politics they represented 
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was viewed as outmoded and increasingly obsolete - in a word, old.288 This sentiment 
was captured in a letter to the editor, which proclaimed: “the age of arguing…is long 
gone and the new generation of men and women who not only can plan for a real future 
but also who can possibly transform reason into actions [is upon us]. The new blood can 
do it and we call on KANU to change now or changes will override it.”289 As this passage 
suggests, political change was viewed by much of the population as being inevitable; 
however, what the terrain of this “new” Kenya would look like remained highly 
contested.  
If the politics of the Moi regime were increasingly viewed as anarchic and 
backward, the way “forward” was articulated through the rhetorical mobilization of a 
series of oppositions. A revitalized Kenya required a “new generation” of leaders to enact 
“new,” “transparent” and “democratic” policies. Perhaps expectedly, these traits came to 
inhere in the category of “youth,” something instrumentalized by both Moi and the 
opposition. Indeed, the 1992 election year is notable for the wholesale transformation of 
youth into a powerful political category.  
The Moi regime’s actions following the advent of pluralist politics suggests that 
critiques which positioned the regime as a gerontocracy, pointing both to the length of its 
tenure and the backward (as opposed to modern) nature of its politics, had substantial 
political purchase. Following the December 1991 proclamation, Moi expanded the 
KANU Youth Wing renaming it “Youth for Kanu ’92,” in an attempt to revitalize the 
regime’s image. This initial political mobilization of the category of youth, however, had 
unforeseen consequences, which were shaped by the socio-economic climate of the 	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continent in the late 1980s. As Mamadou Diouf notes: “In its cultural and political 
versions, the nationalist project sought to…maintain the frontier between elders and 
juniors that characterized African values, and to put young people at the center of its plan 
for economic development and national liberation.”290 As the economy faltered, however, 
Kenyan youth found themselves increasingly alienated power and thus socio-economic 
and cultural adulthood. As we have seen, however, the politicization of the category of 
youth had a long history in Kenya. It was this vascillation of rhetoric that variously 
positioned youth as threat and youth as source of regeneration that had animated many 
facets of the politics of mobility throughout the colonial period. However, in the neo-
liberal context, which “had particularly dreadful effects on young people,” the attempt to 
mobilize youth as a powerful political and economic category, while reinforcing 
“traditional” deference to elders was an untenable prospect.291 It was at the intersection of 
youth as a symbolic category of national regeneration, and as an identifiable and 
marginalized sector of the population, that the politics of matatu industry workers 
emerged.  
The opposition party that most vigorously aligned itself with this new brand of 
politics was the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). Smith notes that the 
name of the party referred to the industriousness of Henry Ford and thus to modern, 
capitalist development. Actively linking politics to Ford automobiles, FORD activists 
drew on a deep seated cultural logic that read politics writ large through the politics of 
mobility and its associated technologies. It also suggested a new temporal timeline for 
development. Smith writes:  	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This active, transgressive meaning of development [that was advocated by the 
opposition] was best expressed in the phrase, common during the Moi years, ‘we 
want maendo…leo.’ Here development (maendeleo) was modified to refer to 
actions (maendo) preformed today (leo), a urge that cut against the idea of a 
natural slow development manifesting behind people’s backs, for which citizens 
and politicians had to patiently wait.292  
 
Within the context of these rhetorically youthful politics, the matatu industry workers 
emerged as a powerful socially youthful energy to harness, particularly given their 
history of resistance to state policies.293  
Importantly, the media positioned matatu industry workers as the unofficial youth 
arm of FORD, as the opposition’s counter-point to KANU’s youthwingers. Trouble 
between the two groups began in 1992, when the Moi government charged its 
youthwingers with the responsibility of collecting a new levy being exacted from matatu 
workers.294 Touts (conductors) and drivers fiercely resisted the policy, astutely refusing to 
pay the tax. The nature of these refusals articulated non-engagement as a right, pointing 
to the particular form of political (dis)engagement that would become characteristic of 
the practices of industry workers. Beginning rather benignly, matatu workers simply 
refused to pay the levy, explaining that as supporters of the opposition (FORD) they had 
a right to decline payment, for they did not see any reason why they should be coerced 
into lining KANU’s pockets with their shillings.295 If they were to be compelled to pay 
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the levy, moreover, they demanded to know how the money was being spent, as they saw 
no improvements in the roads or at the bus terminals.296  
In this way, the workers criticized the indistinct line between the political and 
bureaucratic arms of the state, demanding a clear separation between the two, and 
claimed it to be their right as citizens to refuse complicity with this form of structural 
corruption. In effect, they made claims to non-participation that wananchi transport 
narratives gestured towards but did not fully realize. Positioning their refusal as a right 
they were, in effect, radically transforming “the idea of citizenship” through putting the 
new principles of multi-party democracy at the centre of their practices.297  
It was only when KANU refused to recognize these rights that the conflict 
between the two youth groups became violent. On December 16, the press recounted a 
conflict that broke out at the Machakos Bus stop:  
During the clash… the kiosks used by Kanu youthwingers for collection of 
parking fees were set on fire and documents inside destroyed. Several people 
were injured in the incident as police arrested others…The touts pelted the Kanu 
kiosks with stones as they loudly cheered FORD juu [top or high], FORD juu. 
They also set Kanu youth uniforms and berets on fire. Several Kanu youth 
wingers were trapped inside the kiosk and they had to strip naked to avoid the 
charging touts.298 
 
This marginalized population chose retreat from conventional politics over engagement 
with what was viewed as an ineffective and illegitimate political system. It was in the 
context of the perceived failures of this outmoded politics that this youthful population 
developed an alternative brand of political engagement, which violently challenged the 	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state through its rhetorically youthful proxy. This did not entail depoliticization. Rather, 
they set about creating their “own spaces of production and recreation…[their] own 
modalities of politics with which to address the economic and political conditions 
that…[determined their] plight.”299  
Their practices are perhaps not best read as a retreat at all, but as an instance of 
selective engagement. By articulating their opposition as a political opposition, they were 
firmly rooting their critique in the language of multi-party democratic processes; 
however, their violent expressions of dissent both pointed to the state’s tendency to act 
outside of the prescribed limits of the law – KANU youthwingers being mobilized as an 
arm of the state – and rejected the prevailing system of politics as a failed one.  
The manner in which their politics of disengagement was expressed was further 
shaped by the relative social positions of the two youth groups. A number of stories ran 
which suggested that although youthful, the members of KANU ’92, were not 
representative of the youth of Kenya, being children of wealth and privilege.300 In other 
words, this group was composed of youth defined by age-set rather than by markers of 
socio-cultural “immaturity.” By contrast, matatu industry workers, though many had 
achieved biological adulthood, were popularly referred to as youth by virtue of their 
socio-cultural status. These divergent definitions of the category of youth had important 
consequences for the shape of the conflict between the two groups and were central to 
informing the climate of inter-generational relations more generally. Indeed, destroying 
the kiosks from which KANU ’92 collected levies communicated the touts’ perception 
that state corruption had rendered it illegitimate and simultaneously destroyed the 	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material sites representative of the maintenance of privilege through corruption, their 
actions constituting a “kind of class warfare.”301 This action, like others, aimed at calling 
the state to account for its multiple failures to uphold the tenets of a politics that 
emanated from its own offices and spoke to the desire for a radically transformed socio-
cultural terrain. 
The failure of the state to conform to its purported structures of legality informed 
the politics of matatu industry workers throughout 1992. Despite government demands 
for national unity unencumbered by “tribalism,” there is substantial evidence that the Moi 
regime was backing Kalinjin militias to destabilize the country in the year leading up to 
the election. This was not lost on either the opposition or the press, both of which accused 
the government of inciting “ethnic” violence.302 Throughout 1992, these armed groups 
targeted predominantly Kikuyu areas - the largest ethnic group in Kenya and the 
population that theoretically posed the greatest threat to a Moi win - leading to the 
displacement and death of thousands of Kenyan citizens.  
Of particular media attention was violence that occurred in the Molo district in 
March 1992. After the initial attacks, leaflets were circulated calling on all Kikuyu 
residents to leave the Rift Valley, or suffer violent retribution. In response, touts 
mobilized at the Nakuru parking bay and halted services in solidarity with the victims of 
the clashes, which resulted in a violent conflagration with the local police.303 Following 
these clashes, the national papers ran a number of stories recounting the violent behaviour 
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of touts, who repeatedly targeted customers caught with arrows; a symbol become 
emblematic of the ongoing “ethnic” clashes.304 On April 14 it was reported 
An unidentified man yesterday escaped death narrowly when angry touts set upon 
him and beat him seriously after intercepting him with a bag full of arrows. 
Business at the busy Nakuru main bus terminus was temporary [sic] interrupted as 
the men beat the suspect, who was about to board a matatu destined from the Kwa 
Ronda slums south-west of Nakuru town.305 
 
Nakuru, though a cosmopolitan centre, has a majority Kikuyu population. Furthermore, 
located in the Rift Valley Province – Moi’s home province – it was a highly contested 
political region in the 1992 election year. The location of this attack, in conjunction with 
the perceived political stakes of its geography, suggests that it had expressly activist, 
interventionist aims. In a context where the state was perceived to be unable or unwilling 
to uphold its own laws, this population forged different routes to ensure regional 
security.306 Although rejecting as false the state’s proclaimed commitment to the tenets of 
secular multi-party politics, the values inhered in those unfulfilled claims retained 
substantial purchase for industry workers and shaped the contours of their actions. Two 
weeks later, The Standard ran another story titled “Mob lynches bow man.” Journalist 
Elijah Kinyanjui reported that touts and hawkers had set upon the man while he was 
trying to board a matatu, having found bows in his bag.307 In the absence of state 
intervention in inter-citizen violence, indeed in a context where many believed the state 
to be the cause of the violence, alternate practices, which though violent were firmly 
embedded in the rules ostensibly governing the new political terrain, were located.  	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Matatu industry workers were in a unique position to engage in “citizens’ 
justice.” Located at the nodes connecting different regions of the country, the matatu 
continued to serve as a space within which information, along with human cargo, was 
transported. Because the matatu industry was privatized, moreover, the politics that 
occurred within the confines of the matatu proper, and in its spatial extensions - the parks 
and stops - were largely outside the reach of the coercive state. Matatus thus functioned 
as moving sites of political engagement, and acted as conduits, spreading information 
along the country’s road system.308  Like in the colonial period, it was this particular 
spatial mobility that allowed industry workers to engage in practices that disrupted the 
smooth functioning of the state and forcefully register a commentary on the socio-
economic and politico-cultural climate.  
     *** 
 That this brand of politics was viewed as a threat by the older generation must be 
contextualized against other discussions of youth that were ongoing in the print media. 
Concurrent to these more violent enactments of youthful politics, there emerged a more 
general climate of anxiety surrounding the role of youth in the multi-party context. 
Rehearsing a familiar script, people were particularly concerned that youthful practices 
symbolized the untethering of the social category of youth from one of its most important 
features, deference to elders. This perceived inversion of the moral order produced 
narratives where the category of youth did not function as a metaphor for a better future, 
but as a symbol of descent into chaos. Papers ran pieces with titles such as “Let’s get 
serious about the youth,” “Youth must obey laws,” “Youth rains blows on elders” and, 
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most explicitly, “Youth destroying future.”309 These narratives centered on forms of 
youthful deviance that were the perceived outgrowth of the politicization of the category 
of youth. This development, it was believed, had led to the decay of the important 
strictures of generation, which had heretofore bound youth to the authority of their 
elders.310  
Reading these stories from the perspective of their protagonists, however, resituates 
youth actions, allowing us to see them as a response to the economic exclusions that grew 
out of neo-liberal reforms. Under these altered conditions, particularly youthful 
solidarities formed, suggesting that many Kenyan youth viewed their socio-cultural 
advancement to have been unfairly blocked by elders. On October 5, 1992, The Daily 
Nation journalist, Stephan Munyiri, reported a conflict between church leaders and a 
group of youth. He wrote:  
Youths wanted to beat the cleric and the church leaders to demonstrate their 
sympathy with four of their colleagues who had been excommunicated from the 
church for allegedly showing disrespect to church elders…The youth soon started 
throwing…musical instruments and shouting ‘Thief! Thief!’; with some heading for 
the pulpit.311  
 
A similar story titled “Youth rains blows on elders” ran in The Standard on June 10.312 
As in the earlier narrative, the violence was triggered by economic grievances. In this 
case elders had demanded youths pay a fine, a demand which one refused. When the 	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elders threatened him with the cane “he turned violent and reversed the situation, turning 
the hunter into the hunted by administering indiscriminate blows on the elders.”313  
Though elders read this youthful violence as an inversion of the normative 
functioning of the moral economy, from the perspective of the youth, their actions 
represented an assertion of their right to determine what material exchanges constituted a 
fair transaction within that economy. The refusal of youth to defer to the authority being 
claimed by elders was intimately linked to the perception that elders’ claims were 
illegitimate. Situated this way, it appears that these engagements did not constitute an 
attempt to invert the moral order, but rather an attempt to reconfigure the relationships 
that constituted that order in the context of changing socio-economic and political 
circumstances.  
As will be shown, there is a good deal of overlap between the structure of these 
situations and those practices of the matatu industry workers that the older generation so 
detested. In both instances, structural inequities, which had functioned to marginalize 
youth, were interpreted through the prism of relationships defined by generation as it was 
linked to proximity to power. In the neo-liberal context generation had, indeed, become 
“an especially fertile site onto which class anxieties…[were] displaced.”314 
As Kenyan youth threatened normative expectations of deference to generational 
authority, matatu industry workers emerged as the central symbol of youthful deviance. 
Importantly, however, it was not the expressed politics of the industry workers that was 
the most contested domain, but the day-to-day customs of the touts. In other words, the 
strain of politics articulated as most likely to subvert Kenyan youth, uprooting them from 	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their appropriate location within Kenyan society, functioned at the level of seemingly 
apolitical routine practice. A particularly heated debate surrounded the volume of music 
played in the matatus. As one disgruntled matatu customer wrote in a letter to the editor:  
I congratulate the Commissioner of Police for the decision to ban loud music in 
matatus. The noise which the matatu people referred to as music is not only harmful 
to the ears, but is dangerous to victims of heart attack and high blood pressure…What 
is more disturbing about matatu operators is that if they are asked to reduce the 
volume, they either laugh or hurl insults.315 
 
The central anxiety was not the volume of the music, per se, but rather the antagonistic 
response of the matatu industry workers when asked to reform their practices, for the 
sake of those likely to suffer from “heart attacks” and “high blood pressure.” Not only 
were these irreverent industry workers deaf to the demands of their elders but, most 
threateningly, the very fact of their mobility allowed these youths to evade the monitoring 
of the state, and thus to openly reject adult authority expressed through demands based on 
divergent notions of taste and propriety. This particular spatial advantage was not lost on 
matatu industry workers, who were notorious for turning their music down in the city 
center in order to avoid confrontation with the police, only to raise the volume when 
safely beyond its limits. This routine was premised on another logic of taste and 
distinction. As one matatu operator noted: “If your matatu doesn’t causes [sic] a 
marurumi (thunderstorm) while playing the latest hip hop music…no one will enter it.”316 
These forms of insubordination in the face of elders, it was feared, functioned to reroute 
authority, locating it in the hands of the matatu youth. 
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The role of matatu culture in shaping the climate of inter-generational relations 
during the transition period should not be underestimated. Indeed, elders repeatedly 
alluded to the possibility of contamination, registering the fear that these behaviours 
might represent the “new” Kenyan youth.317  These anxieties were not wholly unfounded, 
for the question of music in matatus did break down along generational lines.318 While 
elders framed the debate over music within the broader discourse of appropriate inter-
generational relations, Kenyan youth refashioned the terms of the debate in a language 
that suggested the mobilization of their rights, not as stipulated by age or socio-cultural 
position, but as Kenyan citizens. As one youthful commuter put it when asked his opinion 
on an attempted music ban: “We’ve got freedom of everything, we’ve got freedom to 
choose the music we want. If these songs are not banned in the country, why should they 
ban them in the matatus.”319  
The opening of the political system had evidently introduced the language of 
“freedom” as it was associated with “democratic” reforms into the everyday lexicon of 
Kenyan youth. In some mobilizations, these definitions of freedom worked at cross-
purposes with elders’ visions of appropriate behaviour. Particularly as subsections of 
youth employed this language not to demand their right to inclusion but to assert their 
right to difference. Kenyan youth, through constructing “new sociabilities whose function 
…[was] to show their difference,” were radically questioning their position within 
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Kenya’s socio-politico and cultural terrain, articulating new, potentially subversive 
political subjectivities.320   
Markers of difference were crucial to the politics expressed by the youth of the 
matatu industry, and taste became one of the central means by which difference was 
asserted. Elders lamented the new dress code being adopted by touts, which consisted of 
an “expensive printed shirt, baggy black jeans. Reebok shoes and an American…cap.”321 
As noted by Fernando Coronil, for populations excluded from the regular routes of 
power, mode of comportment becomes an important strategy through which to express 
dissent, for “the body is everywhere a source of symbolic production…[which can] 
challenge, confirm, or play with existing social hierarchies.”322 The development of a 
unique sartorial style was part and parcel of broader transformations within matatu youth 
culture, which placed markers of their “outsider-status” at the heart of their 
communicative praxis.323 In other words, while debates over music and style might not 
appear to be politicized discourses I would argue that, particularly in the context of the 
politicization of the category of youth, these practices emerge as distinctively political. 
Indeed, these youthful actions provided an embodied political commentary that was 
enacted in and through everyday practices, which expressed both the right to difference 
and disillusionment with the cultural politics of an outmoded generation.324  
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Matatu industry workers, at the very least, viewed these issues as being highly 
politicized. In response to the music ban they repeatedly went on strike over the course of 
1992.325 Given the reliance of the Kenyan economy on the functioning of the industry, 
with 70 per cent of Nairobi’s residents dependent on matatus to transport them to and 
from work, they were in a unique position to make demands on the government they 
rejected.326 As one letter to the editor stated:  
Kenya is certainly experiencing a lot of change since the advent of [the] multi-
party era. However, none is more shocking than the recent event of matatu 
operators marching to see the President…Should the government decide to side 
with the matatus...then I am afraid we shall create a serious precedent which 
would see…matatus taking the law into their own hands.327  
 
He went on to note the unprecedented power of the matatu industry workers who had 
gone out of their way to repeatedly ridicule and embarrass KANU and the police, 
mocking their roles as figures of authority. This commuter seems to have recognized a 
bizarre truth. Due to the economy’s reliance on the functioning of the industry, this 
marginalized socially youthful population had accrued a measure of political power that 
was unprecedented in the context of Moi era Kenya where organized labour unions had 
been rendered functionally non-existent.328 Through publicly challenging the legitimacy 
of a regime that prided itself on having silenced nearly all forms of dissent, they 
effectively chipped away at the façade of the dictatorial state dominated by the figure of 	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Moi. It was the integration of these practices into the public sphere that constituted them 
as real resistances, which though “semiotically imprecise” when read by an older 
generation, were “all the more potent because of their publicity.”329  
 It is worth noting that the politics of industry workers constituted something of a 
repetition when read against the longer history of Kenya’s politics of mobility. In its first 
incarnation what came to be known as the matatu industry had effectively destroyed the 
KBS’ monopoly on urban transport. The networks connecting nodes across the country 
had then, as in the context of 1992, enabled the communication of messages and the 
registering of grievances. Only now it was the postcolonial, rather than colonial, 
government that was viewed as “depricing” people of their wages. This was the new 
generation of athami, who were again struggling under the weight of structural 
constraints on their social maturity and pushing against the ideology of age that justified 
their exclusion.  
     *** 
The December 1992 elections did not see a change in regime for Kenyans. The 
opposition had fragmented, a process fomented by the corrupt practices of the Moi 
government, which had lined the pockets of potentially threatening opposition forces, 
distributing millions of shillings, which were, incidentally, never registered with the 
central bank. Nor did the country’s economy improve following Moi’s re-election, 
indeed, by 1993 Kenya was mired in a fiscal crisis with rates of inflation reaching 100 
per cent.330 While the politics embedded in transportation narratives and the practices of 
youthful matatu workers did not transform the Moi dominated state, they did function to 	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complicate the smooth functioning of this faltering and increasingly corrupt regime; in 
some instances even puncturing its fabric.  
Elders viewed the emergent politicized youth culture as a threat to “traditional” 
forms of authority, revealing a climate of generationally rooted anxiety that was 
compounded by altered socio-political conditions. To them, the practices of industry 
workers and youth appeared wholly disconnected from politics proper, rather than as 
evidence of an incredibly frustrated cultural politics that had at its core a belief in the 
inefficacy of the Kenyan political system.  Ironically, the change desired by such a large 
proportion of the Kenyan population was subverted by the generational mistranslation of 
the practices of Kenyan youth as it was symbolized by the behavior of the matatu 


























Scholarship on the politics of dissent in postcolonial Africa has argued for the recent 
emergence of youth as a politically salient category, and generation as the fault line of 
conflict.331 Concurrent to these debates, social theorists have repeatedly remarked upon 
the relative neutrality of “space” in contemporary scholarship in the social sciences and 
humanities.332 This thesis has worked to generate an analysis that draws on these insights 
but, concurrently, pushes both to historicize these claims by turning to the perspectives of 	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historical actors themselves. In doing so, I have argued that generational conflict and 
contestations over the matrices of social adulthood has formed the nexus of politics since 
the early colonial period in Kenya, and that the place of space in shoring up conservative 
and exclusive political orders has, from the beginning, been critical to these 
developments.  
Colonial rule in the Kenya colony was premised on an incredibly restrictive 
spatial logic. And circumscribing the movement of Africans formed the crux of colonial 
praxis. The extension of infrastructures of mobility in the form of roads and railways was 
part and parcel of this process. It produced the Kenya colony as a mappable territory, 
making the land and its people “legible.”333  
The reorganization of Kenya’s topography radically transformed precolonial 
social relations wherein mobility was a core feature - a strategy of resistance in the 
context of inequitable social relations, and a means of reducing pressure in the context of 
overstretched land. Kenyan “youth” bore the brunt of these transformations, compelled as 
they were to cut and maintain the colonial government’s routes of rule and blocked from 
achieving the landed status critical to achieving full maturation.  
Infrastructures of mobility were thus never “modern” in the sense discussed by 
Paul Edwards. They were not the unremarked background of social life but constitutive 
of social relationships in the Kenya colony. As paths to social maturation were 
increasingly blocked, roads became emblematic of the perversions of this moral economy 
in Central Province and the Rift Valley. That is not to say, however, that the spatial 
politics of colonial rule constituted a wholesale rupture in precolonial imaginings of, and 
itineraries to, social adulthood. Nor that it completely transformed the moral economy of 	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the people living in Kenya’s Central Province and Rift Valley. Instead, I have argued that 
the transformations wrought by colonial capitalism in the Kenya colony articulated with 
precolonial imaginings of self-mastery. Through this process of articulation, the routes of 
“development” and the routes of “adulthood” came to intersect in incredibly complex 
ways. 
Colonial rule, clearly, is never experienced in the singular, and for every avenue 
to individual and collective “development” blocked, new tributaries were forced open by 
populations increasingly excluded from realizing full maturity according to precolonial 
models. Into this heady mix entered technologies of mobility, which themselves became 
deeply implicated in these incredibly disruptive yet enabling processes. From the early 
colonial period, surfaced roads and access to automotive technologies mediated 
relationships between the colonizer and the colonized, but within this general binary, they 
were equally critical in their capacity to mediate relationships between headmen and the 
populations over which they governed, between “elders” and putative “youth.” It was 
this: “growing bitterness between the generations that” as John Lonsdale remarks “was 
one of the most fundamental consequences of alien rule.”334 
However, road infrastructures and technologies of mobility were not simply 
negatively coded. They were also embedded in the popular imaginary as a promise. They 
were the avenues by which people could achieve self-mastery according to newly defined 
criteria. The consolidation of the wage labour economy, and the attendant emergence of a 
class of Kenyans with capital to expend, provided new opportunities for consumption and 
led to the emergence of new measures of prestige and power, and the fashioning of new 
subjectivities, which jostled for preeminence in struggles I have labeled the politics of 	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mobility. While the colonial state had wagered that the cultivation of desire was a means 
to secure a labouring force without the need for coercion, technologies of mobility 
revealed themselves to be commodities of a different sort. People’s ability to own these 
colonial “things” was certainly evidence of their deeper implication in the wage labour 
economy. However, the nature of these commodities also enabled users to evade the most 
hated aspects of colonial rule and the restrictive spatial logic upon which it was premised. 
As social spaces were reconfigured, older models of migration were drawn on by the 
increasingly policitized category of “youth.” As routes to social adulthood were blocked, 
youth marshaled technologies of mobility in an effort to reconfigure the social 
topography and their place within it. In the process, “youth” repeatedly contested the 
criteria for measuring maturation, putting these technologies to uses unanticipated by the 
state, local officials, or “traditional” authorities.  
In this way, “youth” seized the quintessential markers of British prestige and 
transformed them into powerful symbols of youthful insubordination. As this suggests, a 
monopoly over this new political arena, which placed mobilities and their related 
technologies at the centre of debate, could not be retained by any one interested party – 
the state, district officials, headmen, elders, wage-earners, revivalists – but was 
continuously debated, appropriated, and repurposed.  
Throughout this story, we have seen how seemingly neutral technologies were 
lashed to these divergent political projects, and how their very materiality, their capacity 
to move bodies as well as goods, ideas as well as promises, was critical to their 
interpretive flexibility. It was this flexibility that allowed technologies of mobility to 
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become central idioms in the political struggles animating life in Central Province and the 
Rift Valley. 
The slow path to maturation was transcended by automotive transport, which 
offered as a promise an accelerated route to self-mastery, here defined according to newly 
emergent criteria. It was through this process that the two concepts of “development” 
were tethered, neither one displacing the other. “Development” and wiathi, thus became 
two sides of the same coin, both mediated through technologies of mobility.  
Kenya’s postcolonial political leadership drew on these historical precedents in 
shoring up its ideally imagined capitalist future. In this, it was not so different from its 
colonial forebearer. Like the colonial state, the postcolonial state worked to secure 
monopolies over the mobility of its subjects. Like the colonial state it used the circulation 
of technologies of mobility to mark the prestige of their possessors. Finally, like the 
colonial state it further worked undo the relationship between material processes and 
rhetoric of “development.”  
However, the relationship between sign and signifier in both the case of 
“development” and wiathi has not remained stable. In the minds of many, the matrices for 
measuring either are uncertain and, at moments, appear to be up for grabs. 
“Development,” in particular, has multiple valences: a hoped for and idealized future, a 
fraught and contested present, and a violent and overburdened past. In the colonial period 
the contradictions of “development” were marked by the death of coerced labourers, 
forced to maintain district and provincial roads. These contradictions were intimately 
linked to transformations in the meaning of wiathi over the course of the colonial period 
as the relationship among virtue, wealth, and eldership were transmogrified. As land was 
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stretched, wealth, and thus wiathi was further concentrated in the hands of the few. These 
“few,” importantly, were often the same class of men responsible for calling up forced 
labourers to work “on the road.” 
These transformations were brought into full relief under the neoliberal reforms of 
the 1980s. It was in this decade that the already over-stretched colonial infrastructures 
reached their breaking point, as the promises of infrastructural postcolonial modernity 
faltered, their ruins symbolic of the ‘instabilities, shortages, constraints, and blockages” 
that had characterized the colonial period.335 The politics of mobility have remained 
central to these struggles as road-related deaths, though a point of popular critique, are 
also read as the “blood-price” for development.336 Similarly, the postcolonial era has 
demonstrated, for many, that eldership as it is linked to political power has retained the 
link to the redistribution of wealth and the generational transference of power in name 
only. 
The slippage this has produced between signifier and signified has not decreased 
the powerful way in which roads discourse operates as a political idiom in the 
postcolonial context. Instead, roads and technologies of mobility operate as the political 
language of the everyday in Kenya. They are part of the shared world of symbolic 
meaning uniting the commandant and wananchi.  
By contrast to Mbembe’s characterization of the banal in postcolonial Africa, this 
has not led to mutual zombification, to the destruction of the language of critique. Instead, 
technologies of mobility have operated to reroute power and authority, even while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Achille Mbembe and Janet Roitman. “Figures of the Subject in Times of Crisis.” The 
Geography of Identity. Ed. P. Yaeger, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996), 171. 
336 Lamont, “Speed Governors,” 376.  
	   145	  
reinscribing their ideological patina as stand-ins for “development” and modernity. It is 
the Janus-faced nature of the discourse and materialities of these technologies that have 
transformed them into sites for: “transforming, enacting…[and] protesting power 
relations within the social fabric.”337 
Historicizing the these processes over the longue durée brings us somewhat closer 
to understanding the salience of roads discourse and debates over technologies of 
mobility and the way that they shape the contemporary political scene in independent 
Kenya. To return to Judy’s statement, this everyday political lexicon is used to mark 
important transitions in Kenyan governance, and to mark important transformations in 
how Kenyan’s engage with their political elite. Its salience, as I hope I have shown, then, 
is not a product of a shallow history but is due to the fact that technologies of mobility, as 
stand ins for development, has powerfully overlain an enduring discourse of rights, one 
with precolonial precedents, that connects virtue, upward social mobility, and respectable 
adulthood, to the redistribution of wealth and responsible leadership. In the final 
assessment, in invoking the language of roads, Kenyans are making recourse these 
historical precedents, working to transform them to meet the pressing issues of poverty 
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